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SINGLE-GENDER MARRIAGE:
A RELIGIOUS PERSPECTIVE
by REv. RAYMOND C. O'BRIEN*
INTRODUCTION
Little has changed so rapidly and so pervasively as family law in the
United States. The dynamism of this change is revolutionary. "Long-settled
principles and practices regarding divorce, marital property, spousal support,
and custody, to mention only a few instances, have been abandoned or sub-
stantially modified over the last few decades."' Not only has there also been
a radical transformation of principles and practices, there has been a concom-
itant genesis of new phrases, properties, encroachments and relationships. 2
Beginning in the late sixties, the federalization 3 of family relations steadily
* Professor of Law, The Catholic University of America and the Georgetown University
Law Center. I wish to make clear that, as a Roman Catholic priest, I accept the Church's teach-
ings and believe that single-gender marriage is morally wrong and ought never to be sanctioned
by law. Natural law, I believe, makes this clear. At the same time, I recognize that there are
many who do not share that belief, or even agree that natural law exists at all. Accordingly, the
argument laid out in this Article is an attempt to demonstrate why religious perspectives in a
democracy deserve accommodation, even by those who fundamentally disagree with them.
1. LESLIE J. HARRIS ET AL., FAMILY LAW xxxv (1996). See generally MARY AN GLENDON,
THE TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAW: STATE, LAW, AND FAMILY IN THE UNITED STATES AND
WESTERN EUROPE (1989); June Carbone & Margaret Brinig, Rethinking Marriage: Feminist Ide-
ology, Economic Change, and Divorce Reform, 65 TUL. L. REv. 953 (1991); Lee E. Teitelbaum,
Family History and Family Law, 1985 Wis. L. REv. 1135.
2. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 898 (1992) (holding that husband
lacks power over wife to prevent or procure abortion); Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79
F.3d 790, 838 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. granted sub nom. Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 37,
rev'd, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997) (holding Due Process Clause of federal Constitution protects com-
petent terminally ill patient's right to die with assistance from physician); McCabe v. Sharrett, 12
F.3d 1558, 1562-63 (11th Cir. 1994) (explaining freedom of association and right to marry); John-
son v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 777-78 (Cal. 1993) (addressing question raised in new reproductive
technology: who is the "natural mother" of the child?); In re Baby Boy Doe, 632 N.E.2d 326,
326 (Ill. 1994) (finding "woman's competent choice to refuse medical treatment ... must be
honored" over best interest of her fetus); Ferguson v. Ferguson, 639 So.2d 921, 926 & n.3, 928,
934 (Miss. 1994) (recognizing homemaker services as contributions to acquiring property); Le-
Clair v. LeClair, 624 A.2d 1350, 1352, 1358 (N.H. 1993) (requiring divorced father to pay portion
of son's college expenses); Hawk v. Hawk, 855 S.W.2d 573, 575, 582 (Tenn. 1993) (denying
child's grandparents visitation rights because their rights conflicted with parents' right to pri-
vacy); Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 604 (Tenn. 1992) (discussing resolutions for "disposition
of pre-embryos produced by in vitro fertilization," and providing that divorcing party who does
not want "procreation" using the pre-embryos should prevail where other party may become
parent using other "reasonable" means); William Hohengarten, Note, Same-Sex Marriage and
the Right of Privacy, 103 YALE L. J. 1495 (1994).
3. While federalism can be defined as a system of state and national governmental interac-
tion, whereby the national government concentrates on wealth redistribution and the states on
physical and social infrastructure, federalism used here is intended to include the array of federal
[429]
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encroached on the power of the states to regulate intimate domestic rela-
tions.4 Beginning in the nineties, the federal government shifted power back
to the states through block grants and continuing judicial restraint by federal
courts.5 Initiated through federal constitutional interpretation by federal
courts, the pace for change was quick, individual liberty oriented, and sur-
prising within the last three decades. 6 But the federal judiciary has moved at
a slower pace recently,7 prompting citizens to look to state courts and legisla-
tures for individual liberty guarantees.
State judiciaries have been swept up into the maelstrom of change. In-
deed, as the United States Supreme Court refused to find a fundamental
right to commit sodomy within the confines of the Due Process Clause in
Georgia,8 the state courts of Pennsylvania,9 New York, 10 and Kentucky,"
invalidated sodomy statutes similar to the one upheld by the Court a few
laws enacted by Congress or decided within federal courts. For a good description of federalism
as state and national interaction, see STANLEY ELKINS & ERIC McKITRicK, THE AGE OF FEDER-
ALISM: THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1788-1800 (1993); PAUL E. PETERSON, THE PRICE OF
FEDERALISM (1995).
4. Federal control was initiated through constitutional decisions made within federal courts.
Eventually, federal statutes regularized various state practices such as child support collection,
custody enforcement and prevention of child abuse, making domestic abuse a federal crime
when perpetrators cross state lines, and denying state agencies the ability to prohibit foster or
adoptive services solely because of race. See, e.g., Child Support Enforcement Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 651-669 (1991 & Supp. 1997); Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5101
(1991 & Supp. 1997); Family Violence Prevention and Services Act, 42 U.S.C. § 10401 (1991 &
Supp. 1997); Safe Homes for Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 40221, 108 Stat. 1796,
1926-31 (amended to 42 U.S.C. §§ 10416); Howard M. Metzenbaum Multiethnic Placement Act
of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-382, § 553, 108 Stat. 3518, 4056-57 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 5115a);
Parental Kidnapping and Prevention Act of 1980, 28 U.S.C. § 1738a (1988). For a balancing
proposal, see Naomi R. Cahn, Family Law, Federalism, and the Federal Courts, 79 IOWA L. REV.
1073 (1994).
5. See, e.g., Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, 42
U.S.C. § 1305 (1996); Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 703-04 (1992) (explaining that
domestic relations exception to federal jurisdiction encompasses divorce, alimony and child
custody).
6. Some of the most surprising decisions involve federal courts and individual liberty rights.
See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 382-83 (1978) (holding that state statute prohibiting
marriage without important state interest is violation of Equal Protection Clause); Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973) (holding that right of personal privacy includes right to have abortion);
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (explaining that single people must be treated
equally with married people in distribution of contraceptives); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12
(1967) (holding that equal protection forbids states from preventing interracial marriages); Quill
v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716, 731 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 36 (1996), rev'd, 117 S. Ct. 2293
(1997) (finding that laws prohibiting assisted suicide violate Equal Protection Clause).
7. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (setting limits on congressional
authority under Commerce Clause for first time since 1936). But see SAMUEL H. BEER, To
MAKE A NATION: THE REDISCOVERY OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM (1993) (arguing that federal-
ism and rejection of federal control often ignores benefits or losses within federal proposals).
8. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986).
9. See Commonwealth v. Bonadio, 415 A.2d 47, 51 (Pa. 1980) (invalidating statute because
it lacked rational basis).
10. See People v. Onofre, 415 N.E.2d 936, 938-39 (N.Y. 1980) (invalidating statute regarding
deviate sexual intercourse between unmarried persons under Fourteenth Amendment).
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years earlier. Thus, whereas the Federal Constitution was the earliest harbin-
ger of individual liberty and civil rights, the state constitutions have recently
become far more likely purveyors of individual liberties and protections.
Prompted in part by both federal and state judiciaries, public opinion has
changed as well.12 Change has come to what has for so long been considered
so well understood, so instinctive, and so, to use a judicial word, fundamental.
Although prompted at first by the federal judiciary, change now comes to
family law most often through the state judiciary.13
Since the changes that identify with public perceptions of individual lib-
erty have become commonplace, returning to a time when, for instance, adul-
tery was a crime, seems remote. 14 The abolition of fault in the obtaining of a
divorce, 15 plus the privacy protection afforded couples, single or married, as a
result of Griswold v. Connecticut'6 and Eisenstadt v. Baird,17 all contribute to
and recognize the changes that have occurred in American society regarding
sexual, marital and relationship norms previously thought to be fundamental
to American culture. 18 Indeed, these names were thought to be part of a
natural law common to all human persons.
Why have the changes come about? There seems to be many reasons.
Lawrence Friedman has one insight:
Anyone who thinks about conditions of modem life can quickly
come up with explanations for the triumph of no-fault; too many, in
fact. There is, to begin with, the so-called sexual revolution, which
downplays traditional morality, takes away some of the aura that
surrounded chastity, and champions a rich, full sex life. There is the
cumulative effect of the divorce rate itself; the status is so common
11. See Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487, 489 (Ky. 1992) (invalidating statute
which violated state constitutional guarantees of privacy and equal protection).
12. See Joan Biskupic, Once Unthinkable, Now Under Debate: Same-Sex Marriage Issue to
Take Center Stage in Senate, WASH. POST, Sept. 3, 1996, at Al (concerning issue of same-sex
marriage and Senate debate over Defense of Marriage Act).
13. Increasingly, legal commentators argue that family law is different from commercial
activity and that a state should retain control over its own community identity. "[T]he normative
character of family law is closely tied to a communitarian model of state authority under the
federal constitution." Anne C. Dailey, Federalism and Families, 143 U. PA. L. REv. 1787, 1790
(1995). Furthermore, "[t]he states potentially offer a relatively more inclusionary, deliberative
political life than the national government ever could." Id. at 1876.
14. But see D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-301 (1994 & Supp. 1997). The District of Columbia has
amended its adultery statute to read:
Whoever commits adultery in the District shall, on conviction thereof be punished by a
fine not exceeding $500, or by imprisonment not exceeding 1 year, or both; and when
the act is committed between a married person and a person who is unmarried both
parties to such act shall be deemed guilty of adultery.
Id.
15. Recently, legislatures have enacted more stringent demands pertaining to no-fault di-
vorce when children are involved. There have been statutory requirements of counseling as to
the effects of divorce upon children before a couple may receive a no-fault divorce.
16. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
17. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
18. See generally Janet L. Dolgin, The Family in Transition: From Griswold to Eisenstadt
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that much of the stigma is gone. There is the role of women, and
the new conception of marriage, early signs of which William
O'Neill had discovered in the Progressive era. There is the new in-
dividualism, with its emphasis on personal choice. 19
Professor Mary Ann Glendon also observes why changes in society are
not unique to, and have become a part of, American culture. She writes:
Between 1969 and 1985 divorce law in nearly every Western country
was profoundly altered. Among the most dramatic changes was the
introduction of civil divorce in the predominantly Catholic countries
of Italy and Spain, and its extension to Catholic marriages in Portu-
gal. Other countries replaced or amended old strict divorce
laws. . . . The chief common characteristics of all these changes
were the recognition or expansion of nonfault grounds for divorce,
and the acceptance or simplification of divorce by mutual consent.20
But Professor Glendon is quick to note that the relation between law and
behavior is uncertain and other factors are critical. 2 1 What other factors can
account for the dramatic shift in the law of family relations that seemed so
secure a foundation for every moral discourse just four decades ago? Is it
because we live in an information explosive age, where all the factors are in
doubt and thus nothing is secure enough upon which to take hold? Professor
Lynn D. Wardle of the J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young Univer-
sity, opines that: "Judges are the most library-dependent public officials in
American government." 22 Does the availability of so many possibilities initi-
ate change?
Perhaps the law does not matter at all:2 3 it operates only as a recogni-
tion, not an initiator, of a consensus already established. Perhaps the law of
family relations, created from the cloth of a Judeo-Christian tradition, has
shifted and societies now seek common agreement in the wake of a "now-
gone consensus of the Christian nation."'24 Furthermore, seeking common
agreement plagues secular society as much as its loss troubles those who
think the rules of the Judeo-Christian tradition were just fine. For instance,
no less a secular publication than The New Yorker magazine wrote in its
19. Lawrence M. Friedman, Rights of Passage: Divorce Law in Historical Perspective, 63
OR. L. REV. 649, 667 (1984).
20. MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW 66-67 (1987).
21. See Carol Weisbrod, On the Expressive Functions of Family Law, 22 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 991, 1005, 1005 n.63 (1989) (discussing Professor Glendon's view on the impact of law).
22. Lynn D. Wardle, Critical Analysis of Constitutional Claims for Same-Sex Marriage, 1996
BYU L. REV. 1, 24.
23. See generally MAX RHEINSTEIN, MARRIAGE, STABILITY, DIVORCE, AND THE LAW 406
(1972) ("Experienced observers have long known what we have laboriously tried in this book to
prove, namely, that a strict statute law of divorce is not an effective means to prevent or even to
reduce the incidence of marriage breakdown."); Lee E. Teitelbaum, Moral Discourse and Fam-
ily Law, 84 MICH. L. REV. 430 (1985). Richard Abel, Law Books and Books About Law, 26
STAN. L. REV. 175, 183 (1973) ("[L]egal professionals, with their strong and obvious commit-
ment to the importance of law, are clearly the last people likely to accept its irrelevance. Instead
of doing so, they will make that irrelevance the central problem.").
24. Weisbrod, supra note 21, at 1005.
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Comment section of Antioch College's effort to draft a new code of sexual
engagement between students. It was drafted by students, faculty and admin-
istrators at the college as an effort to prescribe the terms of sexual engage-
ment between students. The magazine was intrigued with the quest for rules:
The notion of "rules" understandably puts people off, conjuring up
as it does, images of lawyers in the bedroom, and so forth. But
there have always been rules for sexual conduct-rules that not so
long ago were far more restrictive than anything dreamed of at An-
tioch College. You didn't pick them up in the dean's office, or with
your personnel packet. You picked them up by making your own
hideous faux pas; and they were enforced by fear of the humiliation
that accompanied failures to observe the sexual customs of your so-
cial class. These tacit codes have now pretty obviously broken
down, so that nobody is entirely clear anymore about what's cool
and what's ground for a lawsuit.
25
Why family law has changed so radically and so quickly is uncertain,
only the fact that it has changed is certain. This Article will describe one of
those changes, the litigation and legislation surrounding single-gender mar-
riage, and then offer a religious perspective as to why the "marriage [between
one man and one woman] exists for the mutual love and support of the
spouses and for the procreation and education of children."' 26 While many
religious perspectives exist within pluralistic America, this Article will ex-
pressly rely upon the perspective of the Roman Catholic Church through the
writings of Pope John Paul II, the Second Vatican Council, and the individual
and joint statements of the American Catholic Bishops. Because the Roman
Catholic Church is an international organization, statements from the Second
Vatican Council and the Pope are particularly corroborative of human per-
ceptions inspired by religious perspective. Obviously too, those other reli-
gious persons and denominations sharing in the expressed opinions
pronounced by the Roman Catholic Church are represented in this
perspective.
In addition to this Introduction and a Conclusion, this Article will offer a
religious perspective which is a response to the legal arguments in favor of
single-gender marriage. Three arguments will be made: first, that the reli-
gious perspective identified and associated with the Roman Catholic tradi-
tion offers a fundamental basis for family life that has been proven to be
beneficial to society as a whole, and to the message of revelation consigned
to Christians by Jesus Christ; second, inasmuch as the religious perspective is
being contradicted by judicial interpretation rather than through legislative
process, a tyranny of judicial activism has and is subverting a public policy
25. Comment NEW YORKER, Nov. 29, 1993, at 10.
26. CATHOLIC STANDARD, Sept. 5, 1996, at 12 (quoting Bishop Joseph L. Charron of Des
Moines, Iowa, Chairman of the Committee on Marriage and Family of the National Conference
of Catholic Bishops, and Bishop William S. Skylstad of Spokane, Washington, Chairman of the
Committee on Domestic Policy of the United States Catholic Conference).
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consensus; and third, an analysis of the Hawaiian decision Baehr v. Lewin,27
which presently prompts the debate over single-gender marriage, offers a
compelling state interest to restrict the definition of marriage to those per-
sons of the opposite gender.
The Hawaii trial court's failure to find a compelling state interest on
remand to support the ban on single-gender marriage has precipitated state
efforts to provide a solution through a constitutional convention and legisla-
tion to provide reciprocal benefits to non-married partners. 28 When the con-
stitutional convention is held and if the people of Hawaii vote to restrict the
definition of marriage to opposite gender persons, the judicial intrusion into
the definition of marriage based on the constitutional interpretation will
cease for the time being. Nonetheless, the debate over single-gender mar-
riage is only one facet of an ever-changing social structure in America. Is this
change similar to that of the sixties and the racial inequities which prompted
the civil rights movement, the change which prompted Loving v. Virginia?
No, race and gender are distinctive in that even the most individual-liberty-
oriented person would admit that there are physical and emotional possibili-
ties and responsibilities associated with gender which have no counterpart in
race. This uniqueness has found representation in history, customs and reli-
gious observance. Gender is not race; marriage is not integration. Former
Secretary of Education, William J. Bennett, recently wrote:
Nor is this view arbitrary or idiosyncratic. It mirrors the accumu-
lated wisdom of millennia and the teaching of every major religion.
Among worldwide cultures, where there are so few common
threads, it is not a coincidence that marriage is almost universally
recognized as an act meant to unite a man and a woman. 29
Any dramatic definitional change in so fundamental an institution as
marriage would foster the societal confusion 30 already experienced in Roe v.
Wade,3 1 when the Supreme Court recognized a woman's right to an abortion,
Compassion in Dying v. State of Washington,32 where the federal Ninth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals recognized a due process right in terminally ill patients
to assisted suicide, and Quill v. Vacco 33 where the federal Second Circuit
Court of Appeals decided that laws prohibiting assisted suicide violated the
Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution. The Supreme
27. 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993). For the most recent opinion on the decision, see Baehr v.
Miike, 910 P.2d 112 (Haw. 1996), affirming the trial court's decision to refuse intervenor status to
The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints.
28. See HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 572C-1 (Michie 1997).
29. William J. Bennett,... But Not a Very Good Idea, Either, WASH. POST, May 21, 1996, at
A19.
30. See generally CASS R. SuNsTErN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT (1996)
(arguing that Supreme Court should proceed narrowly, and with easiest cases, thus allowing
democratic process to flourish and simultaneously avoiding social upheaval).
31. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
32. 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. granted sub nom. Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct.
37, rev'd, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997).
33. 80 F.3d 716 (2d Cir. 1996), rev'd, Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997).
[Vol. 7:429
Sorine 19981 SINGLE-GENDER MARRIAGE
Court opinions in Washington v. Glucksberg34 and Quill v. Vacco, 35 rejected
the judicial activism of both federal circuits, recognizing instead the value in
all sides voicing an opinion. The Glucksberg court wrote: "Throughout the
Nation, Americans are engaged in an earnest and profound debate about the
morality, legality, and practicality of physician-assisted suicide. Our holding
permits that debate to continue, as it should in a democratic society. ' '36 The
courts and the legislatures,. as well as public opinion, continue to swirl not just
in debate, appropriate to a free society, but suffer acts of public disturbance.
Appropriate to current debate, this Article argues that changes in funda-
mental public policy are best reserved to the elected legislative process in
which religion can contribute to the public discussion. This is particularly
true when the rights claimed within the judicial sector are rights which can be
represented within the democratic process of elected representation. 37 Even
Cass Sunstein, in his portentous essay, Homosexuality and the Constitution,3 8
argues that legislatures, not courts, should be at the forefront of the profound
shifts in social and legal policy that are necessary to create gay rights. 39
While a convincing argument can be made that persons of African-American
ancestry were unable to compete within the legislative arena prior to judicial
civil rights successes in the mid-sixties, it is difficult to say that gay and les-
bian persons or any other persons arguing for single-gender marriage cannot
enter into the legislative arena today.40 And religion has a voice and a role
34. 119 S. Ct. 2258 (1997).
35. 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997).
36. Glucksberg, 119 S. Ct. at 2275.
37. See generally Mario M. Cuomo, Some Thoughts on Judicial Independence, 72 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 298 (1997) (arguing for independent judiciary, one not so willing to become involved in
political squabbles).
38. Cass R. Sunstein, Homosexuality and the Constitution, 70 IND. L.J. 1 (1994); see also
SUNsTElN, supra note 30 (emphasizing need for practical considerations at every level of judicial
and political decision making).
39. See, e.g., Toni M. Massaro, Gay Rights, Thick and Thin, 49 STAN. L. REv. 45, 46 (1997);
Sunstein, Homosexuality and the Constitution, supra note 38.
40. Professor Wardle of Brigham Young University writes that there is an "apparent aca-
demic taboo against publicly voicing opposition to homosexual interests." See Wardle, supra
note 22, at 7. In reference to single-gender marriage, he writes:
American law reviews have been publishing articles about same-sex marriage for more
than twenty years. However, the legal literature on this topic has exploded during the
past five or six years. Between January 1970 and December 1975, only eight pieces
were published in American law reviews addressing same-sex marriage. By compari-
son, between January 1990 and December 1995, more than seventy-five articles, com-
ments, or notes discussing same-sex marriage were published in law reviews and other
legal periodicals in the United States ....
The record of recent law review publications has been dramatically one-sided in recent
years. Between 1970 and 1975, the record was somewhat balanced; three of the eight
law review publications about same-sex marriage (38%) criticized or opposed same-sex
marriage. In contrast, between 1990 and June 1995, only one of seventy-two articles,
notes, comments, or essays focusing primarily on same-sex marriage (only 1.4%) fully
defended the heterosexuality requirement for marriage (though it did so on religious,
rather than legal, grounds). Only two other law review pieces about same-sex marriage
published during that period primarily criticized constitutional arguments for same-sex
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to play within that arena too. It is a voice and a role which has worked within
public policy for the betterment of children and families. Within this role has
come the practice, the belief and the voice to say that marriage is unique, it is
definitional in scope, and it is an institution that neither judicially nor legisla-
tively should include single-gender couples.
I. A RELIGIOUS PERSPECTIVE
A. Historical Importance
Long before the Protestant Reformation of the Sixteenth Century, and a
few hundred years after Christianity left the Palestine arena and entered the
cities and the forests of Europe and Asia, the Christian church considered
marriage important enough to society and religion to regulate. 41 Peter
Brown, Rollins Professor of History at Princeton University, writes in The
Rise of Western Christendom, that:
In Francia and Germany, Boniface, [eighth century missionary in
Germany], along with other representatives of a "correct" Christian
order, had come face to face with local communities on the issue of
marriage. They strove to apply canonical rules in the choice of mar-
riage-partners derived, nominally, from Old Testament prohibitions
on incest. These norms reflected, in reality, the marital strategies to
which the inhabitants of the more populous, urbanized centers of
the Mediterranean had long been accustomed. Boniface and the
Frankish bishops refused to recognize marriages within a wide
range of prohibited degrees. 42
The integration of religion into the secular world of marriage and in-
deed, any social activity, was a hallmark of the rise of Christianity. "Moral-
ity, philosophy and ritual were treated as being intimately connected: all
were part of 'religion;' all were to be found in their true form in the
Church. '43 This is very important and must be seen in relation to the separa-
tion of the secular and the religious so prevalent in modem-day society. Such
marriage, while at least as many others attacked marriage as an institution for same-
sex, as well as heterosexual, couples. All of the other (sixty-nine) pieces advocated,
supported, or were generally sympathetic to same-sex marriage.
Id.
41. Obviously, marriage is very important to civil society. See, e.g., Maynard v. Hill, 125
U.S. 190, 205 (1988) (stating "[mlarriage .... create[s] the most important relation in life ... "
and is the foundation of family and society); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383 (1978)
(describing marriage as fundamental right); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965)
(stating marriage is "noble"); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (stating "[m]arriage
... [is] fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race"); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390, 399 (1923) (stating that "right to marry, establish a home and bring up children. is
central tenet to Due Process Clause).
42. PETER BROWN, THE RisE OF WESTERN CHRISTENDOM 268-69 (1996). For an analysis of
the theology of sexual ethics proposed by Augustine of Hippo, (b. A.D. 354), a theology many
think became decisive for all later teachings in the Christian West on issues of marriage, repro-
duction and sexuality, see St. Augustine, Bishop of Hippo, St. Augustine on Marriage and Sexual-
ity, in 1 SELECTIONs FROM THE FATHERS OF THE CHURCH (Elizabeth Clark ed., 1996).
43. Id. at 32.
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separation was foreign to the early church, and was rejected as a vestige of
paganism. Indeed, in the Christian churches during the decades of growth
following the fall of Rome, "[p]hilosophy was dependent upon revelation and
morality was absorbed into religion . . . [b]oth commitment to truth and
moral improvement were held to be binding on all believers, irrespective of
their class and level of culture ... [bloth were inescapable consequences of
having accepted the Law of God."44
Such commitment to integration of religion with secularity was not a
denial of individual liberty, but rather a guarantee of status within a very
democratic group.
Christianity emerged as an unusually democratic and potentially
wide-reaching movement. It takes some leap of the modem imagi-
nation (saturated as it is by later centuries of Christian language) to
understand the novelty of seeing every human being as subject to
the same universal law of God and as equally capable of salvation
through the triumphant or the studious conquest of sin, brought
about through permanent and exclusive membership of a unique
religious group.45
Women were the earliest benefactors of the democratic status early
Christianity provided. Rodney Stark, a professor of sociology and compara-
tive religion at the University of Washington, wrote in The Rise of Christian-
ity, that:
[Tihe Christian woman enjoyed far greater marital security and
equality than did her pagan neighbors. But there was another ma-
jor marital aspect to the benefits women gained from being Chris-
tian. They were married at a substantially older age and had more
choice about whom they married. Since . . . pagan women fre-
quently were forced into prepubertal, consummated marriages, this
was no small matter. 46
Acceptance of the status afforded by early Christianity also signaled ac-
ceptance of the role of the Church to define entry into marriage, the interac-
tion between religion and individual liberty, and what is so sharply criticized
today, the right of the Church to define what is appropriate to society's
morals. Such a notion is captured in former vice president Walter F.
Mondale's quote: "God doesn't belong in politics. '47 But religion through-
out history has always played a role in politics, indeed, it has seen itself as
having a role within politics as offering a constant critique of the public fo-
44. Id.
45. Id. at 26.
46. RODNEY STARK, THE RISE OF CHRISTIANITY 105 (1996). Professor Robert W. Shaffern
notes that pagan households varied widely, but Christianity "regularized the household through
its precepts for marriage, childbearing, sexual mores and family responsibilities, thereby making
the nuclear family normative." See Robert W. Shaffern, Christianity and the Rise of the Nuclear
Family, AMERICA, May 7, 1994, at 13.
47. Kevin P. Quinn, Book Review, AMERICA, Nov. 27, 1993, at 19 (reviewing STEPHEN L.
CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: How AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS TRIVIALIZE RELI-
GIOUS DEVOTION (1993) [hereinafter THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF]).
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rum. This is a very important point. In our dash to preserve the freedom of
religion in the First Amendment guarantee, we prevent the expression of any
religion.
Such a notion that religion and politics should be separate is, of course,
part of the United States Constitution as defined within the First Amend-
ment: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of reli-
gion."'48 Yet, the issue invading the application of the Establishment Clause
is whether it should be read as a rejection of a religious perspective within
politics, that religion is not allowed to play any role in political debate. Some
think yes;49 others think religious morality, theology and action can and
should be brought to bear in any political dialogue. 50 Increasingly, the argu-
ment is made that religion has been denied its voice through the First
Amendment, a voice that is needed to critique a secular culture with very
distinctive characteristics.
For Stephen L. Carter, Professor of Law at Yale Law School and author
of The Culture of Disbelief, the Establishment Clause should not be read as
isolating the secular from the religious, "an approach that, perhaps inevita-
bly, carries us down the road toward a new establishment, the establishment
of religion as a hobby, trivial and unimportant for serious people, not to be
mentioned in serious discourse. ' 51 Such a notion, that religion is folly is
dramatized in a description of a classroom scene from a law school in the
Southwest:
I teach in a law school in which approximately 10% of the students
are fundamentalists, many of whom tell me they are afraid to ex-
press their beliefs in class, because of their fears of peer disapproval.
This disapproval is not the scorn of "politically correct" leftists, who
are not exactly dominant among the student body at the University
of Tulsa, but the clearly classist disdain of apolitical, economically
privileged students toward members of religions identified as
"hicky." 52
The issue facing the Establishment Clause today in secular American cul-
ture is, quite frankly, not whether it offers protection to religious perspec-
tives. The Free Exercise Clause contained within the First Amendment does
this. The real issue is whether there can be an accommodation of religion in
the lives of so many Americans. 53 This accommodation is made particularly
difficult because of the plurality of religions in America, and increasingly, the
48. U.S. CONST amend. I.; see also THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF, supra note 47.
49. See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 1 (1971).
50. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. PERRY, LOVE AND POWER: THE ROLE OF RELIGION AND MORAL-
ITY IN AMERICAN POLITICS (1991); MICHAEL J. PERRY, MORALITY, POLITICS, AND LAW (1988).
51. THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF, supra note 47, at 115. The fact that religion often relies
upon revelation and not on common human experiences, is often the reason for intellectual
intolerance. See, e.g., KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICTONS AND POLITICAL CHOICE
205-06 (1988).
52. Linda J. Lacey, Mimicking the Words, But Missing the Message: The Misuse of Cultural
Feminist Themes in Religion and Family Law Jurisprudence, 35 B.C. L. REv. 1, 15-16 (1993).
53. See generally Thomas Morawetz, Book Review, WASH. POST, Oct. 3, 1993, at 8 (review-
ing THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF, supra note 47).
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bias against religious perspective evidenced by the classroom scene just re-
counted. So too, when the courts, answering to no election referendum, are
able to radically alter established definitions of such family structures as mar-
riage, the courts deny religion a voice and thus protection under the Estab-
lishment Clause. Denial of a voice in fundamental public policy separates
religion from public discourse and fosters the isolation which imparts a sense
of folly to any religious perspective.
Unlike mainstream America, "[t]he legal culture that guards the public
square still seems most comfortable thinking of religion as a hobby, some-
thing done in privacy, something that mature, public-spirited adults do not
use as the basis for politics. '' 54 Religion is dismissed as non-authoritative,
either because its revelatory documents are irrelevant to the times, or be-
cause the religious tradition is a product of ignorance or an underinclusive
natural law. Such an approach is evident in the majority opinion of Baehr v.
Lewin,55 the 1993 Hawaiian decision concerning single-gender marriage.
There the court summarily dismisses any probative validity of restrictions on
single-gender marriage as existent within religious traditions for centuries.
The court decides in an instant that times have changed and all that has gone
before is irrelevant. The Hawaii Supreme Court wrote, "we do not believe
that trial judges are the ultimate authorities on the subject of Divine Will,
and, as Loving amply demonstrates, constitutional law may mandate, like it
or not, that customs change with an evolving social order."56
When the Hawaii Supreme Court decided that the ban against single-
gender marriage would fall unless the trial court on remand could produce a
compelling state interest, many persons, some certainly motivated by deeply
felt religious concerns, reacted quickly. There certainly seemed to be, across
a very broad range of society, and motivated in part out of religious principle,
a resistance to the Baehr decision. For instance, the legislature in Hawaii
acted instantaneously to make explicit the statutory ban on single-gender
marriages, 57 and created a Commission on Sexual Orientation and the Law
to examine the issue.58 Likewise, at least twenty-two states have enacted
statutes refusing to recognize single-gender marriage contracted in another
54. THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF, supra note 47, at 54.
55. 852 P.2d 44 (Haw.), reconsideration granted in part, 875 P.2d 225 (Haw. 1993).
56. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 63. The court refers to Loving v. Virginia, 147 S.E.2d 78 (Va. Ct.
App. 1966), in which the Supreme Court of the United States struck down state statutes which
refused to allow Caucasian persons to marry persons of another race. See Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
57. See 1994 Haw. Sess. Laws 217 § 3 (codified as amended HAw. REv. STAT. §572-1) (de-
fining marriage as between a man and a woman, which reads as follows: "Sec. 572-1. Requisites
of a valid marriage contract. In order to make valid the marriage contract, which shall be only
between a man and a woman .... ") (emphasis supplied). Since enactment of the statute, both
the Hawaii senate and house have called for a constitutional amendment to ban single-gender
marriage. See In Brief Hawaii, L.A. Timas, Feb. 7, 1997, at A23.
58. State of Hawaii, Act of June 22, 1994, No. 217, § 6, reprinted in 20 F m. L. REP. 2013
(1994). This initial commission was disbanded and another appointed, see Hawaii S.B. 888, sec.
3, 18th Leg., 1995 sess. (signed by governor Mar. 28, 1995); this commission voted to allow sin-
gle-gender marriage by 5:2.
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state; nineteen states have legislation pending, and six states have voted
against such legislation. In the three remaining states, either the legislature
has not introduced legislation or the legislature is not in session.59 The Geor-
gia statute is illustrative:
(b) No marriage between persons of the same sex shall be recog-
nized as entitled to the benefits of marriage. Any marriage entered
into by persons of the same sex pursuant to a marriage license is-
sued by another state or foreign jurisdiction or otherwise shall be
void in this state. Any contractual rights granted by virtue of such
license shall be unenforceable in the courts of this state and the
courts of this state shall have no jurisdiction whatsoever under any
circumstances to grant a divorce or separate maintenance with re-
spect to such marriage or otherwise to consider or rule on any of the
parties' respective rights arising as a result of or in connection with
such marriage. 60
Congress passed a similar statute, the Defense of Marriage Act, denying fed-
eral marriage benefits to persons entering single-gender marriage. 61 And, as
was true with judicial decisions regarding abortion and assisted suicide, de-
bate has flourished, 62 but unlike with abortion and assisted suicide, there has
been no violence associated with the legislative process.
Debate and argument are appropriate, even in this country. But, as Pro-
fessor Carter suggests, and history has ratified, religion has a role to play, and
59. See Lisa Keen, Marriage Fight Takes Odd Turn, WASH. BLADE, Apr. 18, 1997, at 1, 26.
60. GA. CODE. ANN. § 19-3-3.1 (1996).
61. See Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (codified as amended
at 1 U.S.C.A. § 7; 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738(C) (West Supp. 1997)). The Act provides:
Sec. 2. POWERS RESERVED TO THE STATES. No State, territory, possession of
the United States, or Indian Tribe, shall be required to give to any public act, record, or
judicial proceeding of any other State, territory, possession, or tribe respecting a rela-
tionship between persons of the same sex that is treated as a marriage under the laws of
such other State, territory, possession, or tribe, or a right or claim arising from such
relationship.
Sec. 3. DEFINITION OF MARRIAGE. In determining the meaning of any Act of
Congress, or any ruling, regulation, or interpretation of the various administrative bu-
reaus and agencies of the United States, the word "marriage" means only a legal union
between one man and one woman as husband and wife, and the word "spouse" refers
only to a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife.
Id.; see generally, Schmitt, Panel Backs Bill Against Official Gay Marriages, N.Y. TIMES, June 13,
1996, at A14.
62. See, e.g., Jennifer Brown, Competitive Federalism and the Legislative Incentives to Rec-
ognize Same-Sex Marriage, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 745 (1995); Richard F. Duncan, Homosexual
Marriage and the Myth of Tolerance: Is Cardinal O'Connor a "Homophobe"?, 10 NOTRE DAME
J.L. ETHics & PUB. POL'Y 587 (1996); Martin D. Dupuis, The Impact of Culture, Society, and
History on the Legal Process: An Analysis of the Legal Status of Same-Sex Relationships in the
United States and Denmark, 9 IN. J.L. & FAM. 86 (1995); Evan Wolfson, Crossing the Threshold:
Equal Marriage Rights for Lesbians and Gay Men and the Intra-Community Critique, 21 N.Y.U.
REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 567 (1994); Thomas M. Keane, Note, Aloha, Marriage? Constitutional
and Choice of Law Arguments for Recognition of Same-Sex Marriages, 47 STAN. L. REV. 499
(1995); Note, In Sickness and In Health, in Hawaii and Where Else?: Conflict of Laws and Recog-
nition of Same-Sex Marriages, 109 HARV. L. REV. 2038 (1996); Note, Marriage, Equal Protection,
and the New Judicial Federalism: A View From the States, 14 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 237 (1996).
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a balance between inculcation of religious perspective and fear of religious
domination of politics must be achieved. 63 That balance is subverted by a
judiciary acting beyond the scope of constitutional review.
If, as most Americans believe, there is a God external to the human
mind, and if that God has tried to communicate with us, whether
through revelation or some other path, then the human task is
surely to discover the contents of that communication, not to sur-
render that possibility in return for the freedom to call one's own
politics God.64
There is a separate entity called God. Neither politicians nor courts may
assume the role of purveyor of revelation: there must be an opportunity for
religion to provide a voice. However, when deeply held religious beliefs are
dismissed cavalierly it is all too often called separation of church and state;
such a practice dismisses the role of religion and lessens the importance of
debate and argument because it subsumes God within any political objec-
tive.65 Those who have spoken of God for centuries deserve an opportunity
to interact in something so important as the definition of marriage.
Professor Carter offers a specific example of the importance of religion,
as a separate entity in any political debate, both as an external moral critic
and an alternative source of values and meaning. 66 His example concerns
civil rights and this is of particular importance to any debate over Baehr and
single-gender marriage. More than any other judicial decision, Baehr relies
upon the 1967 decision of Loving v. Virginia.67 In that civil rights case, a
"Negro" woman and white man were married in the District of Columbia
and then returned to live in Virginia in violation of Virginia's miscegenation
statute. 68 The couple was convicted of a law which banned interracial mar-
riages, the trial judge basing his decision in part on the fact that:
Almighty God created the races white, black, yellow, malay and
red, and he placed them on separate continents. And but for the
interference with his arrangement there would be no cause for such
marriages. The fact that he separated the races shows that he did
not intend for the races to mix.69
At the time of the decision, sixteen states still banned interracial mar-
riages and all of the courts of Virginia upheld the conviction of the couple,
stating that the statutes were constitutional. 70 The couple then challenged
63. See Joan E. Schaffner, The Essence of Marriage, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 195 (1997);
Thomas B. Stoddard, Bleeding Heart: Reflections on Using the Law to Make Social Change, 72
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 967 (1997).
64. THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF, supra note 47, at 73.
65. The United States Supreme Court recently heard arguments in City ofBoerne v. Flores,
117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997). The issue was whether the 1993 Religious Freedom Restoration Act
exceeds Congress' power under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment as a usurpation of state
laws and wrongly shifts the church-state balance in favor of churches. See id. at 2160.
66. See THE CuLTuRE OF DISBELIEF, supra note 47, at 273.
67. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
68. See id. at 2-3.
69. Id. at 3 (quoting trial judge from Circuit Court of Caroline County, Virginia).
70. See id. at 6.
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the statute as a denial of equal protection and due process of laws before the
United States Supreme Court.7 1 The Court quickly overturned the statutes,
holding that there was no legitimate overriding purpose [of the statutes] in-
dependent of invidious discrimination.72 The civil rights of the couple were
protected through equal protection and due process of laws, rights now found
within American society as a whole. Times had changed.
The decision in Hawaii relies heavily on this change in societal norms.
The opinion in Baehr begins with the definition of civil rights as synonymous
with civil liberties, 73 and recites instances when the Hawaii Supreme Court
has protected the civil liberties of state citizens, especially against gender
bias. It is because the state officials refuse to provide the applicants with a
license to marry on the basis of their sex, "that gives rise to the question
whether the applicant couples have been denied the equal protection of the
laws .... ,,74 Thus, as in Loving, Baehr is about the civil rights of litigants.
However, while the Hawaii Supreme Court arrogantly dismisses the religious
dicta of the Virginia trial court, the United States Supreme Court never ad-
dresses the religious dicta of the trial judge recounted in Loving. It does not
need to do so. The historical lesson of the civil rights movement is there for
the record; this is the mid-sixties. The court's opinion rejects White
Supremacy, deplores racial classifications, and dignifies the orderly pursuit of
happiness. These are common elements within the civil-rights movement of
the sixties. And no one can contest the fact that the civil-rights movement
was inspired and in point of fact, led, by a man with religious perspective,
Martin Luther King. Indeed, religious hymns, church basements and march-
ing clergy are the hallmarks of the mid-sixties civil rights movement in
America.
Thus, Loving was certainly within the mainstream of American social
consciousness and it is indisputable that religion was very much involved with
that struggle. Professor Carter, an African-American, notes: "The move-
ment's public appeals were openly and frankly religious, and many of the
nation's political leaders joined in these appeals, and even echoed them in
supporting legislation."'75 It should be of no surprise that religion had a deci-
sive role to play in the Supreme Court's protection of the civil rights of the
Loving couple. Certainly religion did not bring about the judicial victory, but
as Professor Carter states so often: "The religions, for all their arrogance and
sinfulness, can often provide approaches to the consideration of ultimate
questions that a world yet steeped in materialistic ideologies desperately re-
quires."'76 And yes, "it is true that powerful religious voices were raised in
support of racial oppression as well. But ... no religion always challenges the
state's imposed meanings, and few do it very often ... and it is more likely
71. See id. at 2.
72. See id. at 10-12.
73. See Baehr, 852 P.2d at 60.
74. Id. at 60.
75. THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF, supra note 47, at 227.
76. Id. at 273.
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than other competing sources of authority to turn up alternative meanings
precisely because of religions' focus on the ultimate."'77
Baehr is different from Loving. The Hawaii decision does not operate
within the mainstream of social consciousness, nor does it benefit from a reli-
gious movement which brought the religious fervor, oratory and political
nonviolence of Dr. Martin Luther King. The Hawaii decision's quick dismis-
sal of Divine Will is radically different from what can be said of civil rights
promoted by Loving. There is thus a crucial difference between the civil
rights struggle of Loving and the gender inequality of Baehr. For Baehr to
rely upon Loving as a means to avoid Singer v. Hara78 and the definition of
marriage as a "union of one man and one woman[,]" is too great a leap.
Loving could change the definition of marriage to include two people of dif-
ferent races because the social consciousness of America, to include religion,
was present, ready, and advocating change.7 9 For the court in Baehr to hold
that the definition of marriage can now be changed to include persons of
single gender, overlooks the obvious, neither the social conscious nor the
support of religion is present, ready, and advocating change.
Religion is important to people, both to people who believe in its
precepts, and to people who are served by its schools, hospitals, shelters and
other social action ministries. It is also important because it supplies a mean-
ing to countless social issues based on revelation and history. So too, it is
important as an external moral critic, and as a source of values and meaning.
It also offers a tradition, a history, a process tempered by history. It is impos-
sible to ignore the fact that "[c]ontemporary American legal policies con-
cerning the family are rooted in historic patriarchal structures and reflect
notions of normality and morality developed centuries ago in the ecclesiastic
as well as the common law courts."80 A system and a community, a sense of
what is right and wrong and a spill-over of religion into secular society, are
facts of life. 81 This nexus is not to be surrendered easily, nor should it be; it
77. Id. at 272-73.
78. 522 P.2d 1187, 1191, rev. denied, 84 Wash. 2d 1008 (1974).
79. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found that a state ban on assisted suicide violated a
liberty interest guaranteed by the Due Process Clause, the court noted that changed social atti-
tudes incorporated into the Constitution's equal protection guarantees made Loving possible,
for certainly marriage between persons of different races would have been condemned at the
time the Constitution was adopted. See Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 806,
cert. granted sub nom. Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 37 (1997); see also Loving, 388 U.S.
at 1.
80. Martha Albertson Fmeman, Our Sacred Institution: The Ideal of the Family in American
Law and Society, 1993 UTAH L. REV. 387, 389. For an example of the inclusion of biblical
concepts within family structure, see Herbert W. Titus, Defining Marriage and the Family, 3 WM.
& MARY BILL RTs. J. 327 (1994). But see Lacey, supra note 52, at 2 ("An increased emphasis on
pluralism and secularism has virtually removed religious language from dialogue about legal
issues.").
81. Sometimes, the most religious of symbols can be absorbed into the secular culture and
lose the unique religious meaning intended. See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 686
(1984) (allowing city's inclusion of nativity scene in its annual Christmas display, finding that
city's inclusion of creche was secular, showing origins of holiday). But see American Civil Liber-
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provides a moral check on society. "People to whom religion truly matters,
people who believe they have found the answers to the ultimate questions, or
are very close to finding them, will often respond to incentives other than
those that motivate more secularized citizens." 82 Because of this, the opin-
ions of religiously motivated people are significant, and while not always free
from bias, they "attack the sterility of liberal thought and its emphasis on
autonomy. ' 83 Their accommodation and how this is best accomplished is
the issue.
No matter the outcome of Baehr, the compelling state reason required
by the court should include a religious perspective. That religious perspec-
tive offered by the Roman Catholic Church is both national and interna-
tional, subjective and objective, historical and on-going. What follows is a
synopsis of that perspective with an attentiveness to its applicability to find-
ing a compelling state interest in defining marriage as a union of mixed
gender.
B. Pope John Paul II
Pope John Paul II is no stranger to the theme of family life. In his Letter
to Families for the International Year of the Family,84 he writes that "[t]he
family originates in a marital communion described by the Second Vatican
Council as a 'covenant,' in which man and woman 'give themselves to each
other and accept each other." 85 This family "arises whenever there comes
into being the conjugal covenant of marriage, which opens the spouses to a
lasting communion of love and life, and it is brought to completion in a full
and specific way with the procreation of children. '86 Consistently, he draws
upon the words of the Book of Genesis, the start of the Hebrew scriptures,
and creates the basis for the definition of marriage as the union of one man
and one woman. Attentive to the physical difference as proper to marriage,
he writes:
In marriage man and woman are so firmly united as to become-to
use the words of the Book of Genesis-"one flesh" (Gn. 2:24).
ties Union of New Jersey v. Schundler, 104 F.3d 1435, 1450-51 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct.
2434 (1997) (finding that city's display of creche and menorah in front of city hall was not ren-
dered secular by festooning it with four-foot plastic figures of Santa Claus and Frosty the
Snowman).
82. TiE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF, supra note 47, at 275-76.
83. Lacey, supra note 52, at 7; see also David M. Smolin, Regulating Religious and Cultural
Conflict in Postmodern America: A Response to Professor Perry, 76 IOWA L. REv. 1067 (1991);
John W. Whitehead, Civil Disobedience and Operation Rescue: A Historical and Theoretical
Analysis, 48 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 77 (1991); John Whitehead & John Conland, The Establish-
ment of the Religion of Secular Humanism and Its First Amendment Implications, 10 TEX. TECH.
L. REv. 1 (1978).
84. John Paul II, Letter to Families for the International Year of the Family, ORIGINs, Mar. 3,
1994, at 638 [hereinafter John Paul II, Letters to Families].
85. Id. at 641 (quoting John Paul II, Gaudium et spes, in VATICAN COUNCIL II: THE CON-
CILIAR AND POST CONCILIAR DocuMENTs 903 (Austin Flannery ed., 1975) [hereinafter John
Paul II, Gaudium et spes]).
86. John Paul II, Letters to Families, supra note 84, at 641.
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Male and female in their physical constitution, the two human sub-
jects, even though physically different, share equally in the capacity
to live "in truth and love." This capacity, characteristic of the
human being as person, has at the same time both a spiritual and
bodily dimension. It is also through the body that man and woman
are predisposed to form a communion of persons in marriage.
When they are united by the conjugal covenant in such a way as to
become "one flesh" (Gn. 2:24), their union ought to take place "in
truth and love," and thus express the maturity proper to persons
created in the image and likeness of God.87
Surely the physical characteristics of man and woman and the biological
act of begetting are intrinsically important to the definition of family, the
communion of marriage, and the interaction between God and humankind.
It is possible to see in this theology the fact that all persons, "including those
born with sicknesses or disabilities," 88 even "absolutely everyone, including
the chronically ill and the disabled"8 9 as being a part of the genealogy of
God's family of persons. The authentic exercise of begetting within the con-
text of family must, perforce, take place between a man and a woman united
within a communion generated by the covenant of marriage. 90
Covenant is an essential ingredient of marriage and thus family. "Mar-
riage, which undergirds the institution of the family is constituted by the cov-
enant whereby 'a man and a woman establish between themselves a
partnership of their whole life,' and which 'of its own very nature is ordered
to the well-being of the spouses and to the procreation and upbringing of
children"'91 And then of particular importance, the Pope writes: "Only such
a union can be recognized and ratified as a 'marriage' in society. Other inter-
personal unions which do not fulfill the above conditions cannot be recog-
nized, despite certain growing trends which represent a serious threat to the
future of the family and of society itself."92
The Pope thus draws upon the icon of man and woman destined from
the first book of revelation as partners in procreation, mutual commitment,
and an ordered pair for procreation and rearing of children. The fact that a
man and woman would be unable to have children does not separate their
conjugal covenant from the icon of Genesis and the specific definition of
married life ordered by God. Since a single-gender couple would be unable
to form such a union, single-gender unions are beyond the definition of
marriage.
The Pope continually refers to the "great mystery of God."' 93
87. Id. at 642.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 643.
90. See id.
91. Id. at 651 (quoting Catechism of the Catholic Church, 1601; Code of Canon Law, Canon
1055.1).
92. Id.
93. Id. at 653.
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This mystery "is most immediately revealed as the bride of Christ in the do-
mestic church and its experience of love: conjugal love, paternal and mater-
nal love, fraternal love, the love of a community of persons and of
generations. '94 Because conjugal love must be expressed within the capacity
of a man and woman forming a covenant in the image of Adam and Eve, any
sexual union of persons not conforming to this definition are outside the
grasp of the great mystery of God. This definition has been a historical
reality.
Robert W. Shaffern, a historian of medieval Christianity, writes of the
changes brought about by Christianity:
Sexual mores changed along with the evangelization of Europe. St.
Paul held men and women to chastity before marriage, and fidelity
afterward. Although the Christian Middle Ages were by no means
puritanical, the more bizarre sexual practices of the pagan era di-
minished. The diverse households of pagan Rome, Ireland and
Germany meant that many people had multiple sexual partners.
The economy and society of the Roman Empire was built upon the
backs of chattel slaves, whose bodies were often made to serve the
sexual fancies of their masters. Pagan attitudes towards deviance
were ambivalent. Incestuous marriages were common among those
eager to maintain family properties. Homosexuality and pederasty
had few critics in imperial Rome. Christianity, in contrast, insisted
that the only licit sexual relationships were between husband and
wife who intended to have children.95
Responding in part to the changing family structure and to the concomi-
tant sexual attitude, the Pope writes: "How far removed are some modem
ideas from the profound understanding of masculinity and femininity found
in divine revelation. '96 By this statement, he of course incorporates modem
views of sexuality outside of the context of sacramental marriage. Sexuality
outside of the spiritual great mystery of God leads to a separation of spirit
and body, and this leads to:
[A] growing tendency to consider the human body, not in accord-
ance with the categories of its specific likeness to God, but rather on
the basis of its similarity to all the other bodies present in the world
of nature, bodies which man uses as raw material in his efforts to
produce goods for consumption.97
Conjugal love is of a divine nature, it allows men and women to partake
in God's mystery, it means far more than sexual activity. The Pope
concludes:
The deep-seated roots of the great mystery, the sacrament of love
and life which began with creation and redemption and which has
Christ the bridegroom as its ultimate surety, have been lost in the
94. Id. at 654.
95. Robert W. Shaffern, Christianity and the Rise of the Nuclear Family, AMERICA, May 13,
1994, at 13, 14.
96. John Paul II, Letters to Families, supra note 84, at 655.
97. Id.
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modern way of looking at things. The great mystery is threatened in
us and all around us.
98
His conclusion confirms the unique status of mixed gender marriage.
While the letter written to families in 1994 contains many of the ele-
ments particular to a Christian understanding of family, the previous year,
1993, Pope John Paul II published an encyclical, Veritatis Splendor,9 9 which
sought to emphasize the benefits associated with the interaction between
God and the human condition. He laments the loss of God and the splendor
of knowing the interaction between human beings and God-the loss of soul.
In his encyclical, the Pope sought to answer the obscure riddles which, as in
the past, profoundly disturb the human heart:
What is man? What is the meaning and purpose of our life? What is
good and what is sin? What origin and purpose do suffering have?
What is the way to attain true happiness? What are death, judge-
ment and retribution after death? Last, what is that final, unuttera-
ble mystery which embraces our lives and from which we take our
origin and toward which we tend? 1°°
The theme is very similar to that of the great mystery defined earlier.
That is, the necessity of Christ as the model, the unity of body and soul, the
fact that all actions must reflect those of God as revealed in the natural law.
This all comes together in the following passage:
At this point the true meaning of the natural law can be understood:
It refers to man's proper and primordial nature, the "nature of the
human person," which is the person himself in the unity of soul and
body, in the unity of his spiritual and biological inclinations and of
all the other specific characteristics necessary for the pursuit of his
end. "The natural moral law expresses and lays down the purposes,
rights and duties which are based upon the bodily and spiritual na-
ture of the human person. Therefore this law cannot be thought of
as simply a set of norms on the biological level; rather it must be
defined as the rational order whereby man is called by the Creator
to direct and regulate his life and actions and in particular to make
use of his own body."''1 1
Thus, freedom and nature must be bound together; each is intimately linked
to the other.
Faith is a decision involving one's whole existence. It is an encoun-
ter, a dialogue, a communion of love and of life between the be-
liever and Jesus Christ . . . . It entails an act of trusting
98. Id.
99. John Paul II, Veritatis Splendor, OmGINS, Oct. 14, 1993, at 297 [hereinafter John Paul II,
Veritatis Splendor].
100. Id. at 307 (quoting Declaration on the Relationship of the Church to the Non-Christian
Religions [Nostra Aetate], in VATICAN COUNCIL II: THE CONCILIAR AND POST CONCILIAR Doc-
uiErs 1 (Austin Flannery ed., 1975)).
101. Id. at 313 (quoting from Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Donum Vitae,
Instruction on Respect for Human Life in Its Origin and on the Dignity of Procreation, Feb. 22,
1987, Intro. at 3 reprinted in AAS 80, 74 (1988). Cf. Paul VI, Humanae Vitae, July 25, 1968, at 10
reprinted in AAS 60, 487-88 (1968).
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abandonment to Christ, which enables us to live as he lived... in
profound love of God and of our brothers and sisters.'0 2
But this dialogue has parameters, love has context, and the believer and Jesus
Christ has a nexus. This parameter, context and nexus is found within scrip-
tural models and these cannot be altered to conform to changing norms of
gender. The Pope consistently asserts that the established scriptural norms
offer the unique and consummate definition of marriage.
While the two papal documents briefly analyzed, neither capture all of
the writings of John Paul II, nor exhaustively discuss all of the precepts which
could be made applicable to single-gender marriage, the Pope did speak spe-
cifically to the issue on February 20, 1994. While speaking to a gathering of
persons in St. Peter's Square, the Pope said that the European Parliament's
resolution that homosexuals should enjoy the same rights regarding marriage
and the adoption of children seeks to legitimize a moral disorder. 10 3 The
Pope was very specific in denouncing all forms of discrimination against
homosexuals, but said that the action by the European Parliament served to
give legal approval to homosexual activity, specifically, marriage. Such a
balance, between respect of the homosexual person, but condemnation of the
activity, is found in Veritatis Splendor, the previously noted encyclical. There,
the Pope writes:
The church is in no way the author or the arbiter of this norm. In
obedience to the truth which is Christ, whose image is reflected in
the nature and dignity of the human person, the church interprets
the moral norm and proposes it to all people without concealing its
demands of radicalness and perfection.1° 4
Thus, not only because all sexual activity outside of marriage is beyond the
moral norm, but also because marriage between persons of a single gender is
beyond the definition of marriage, is single-gender marriage prohibited.
C. Second Vatican Council
The Second Vatican Council ended on December 8, 1965. When it be-
gan in 1962, having been called by Pope John XXIII, it was the largest gather-
ing of bishops in the Church's history. It was also the most diverse gathering,
assembling 2900 pastors, including approximately 100 who were black, and
those present represented every continent in the world.10 5 At the Council
many documents were approved and some paid particular attention to fam-
ily, marriage and the relationship of the Gospel.
102. Id. at 323.
103. See Trevor Huggins, Pope Slams "Morally Unacceptable" Euro Vote for Homosexual-
ity, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Feb. 20, 1994, at 3. See generally PETER TATCHELL, EUROPE IN
THE PINK: LESBIAN AND GAY EQUALITY IN THE NEW EUROPE (1992); John M. Finnis, Law,
Morality, and "Sexual Orientation," 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1049 (1994); Paul Vlaardinger-
broek, Marriage, Divorce, and Living Arrangements in the Netherlands, 29 FAM. L.Q. 635 (1995)
(discussing the subject of homosexuality and living arrangements in Europe).
104. John Paul II, Veritatis Splendor, supra note 99, at 325.
105. See VATICAN II REVISITED: BY THOSE WHO WERE THERE 342 (Alberic Stacpoole
OSB ed., 1986).
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In a document mentioned often by Pope John Paul II and many Ameri-
can political leaders, the Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modem
World [Gaudium et spes], promulgated at the Council, it is written that, "[t]he
family is the foundation of society. In it the various generations come to-
gether and help one another to grow wiser and to harmonize personal rights
with the other requirements of social life."'1 6 While general, the Council
continues to objectify specific practices which it views as destructive of family
life: "[the] happy picture of the dignity of [married] partnerships is not re-
flected everywhere, but is overshadowed by polygamy, the plague of divorce,
so-called free love, and similar blemishes; furthermore, married love is too
often dishonored by selfishness, hedonism, and unlawful contraceptive prac-
tices." 10 7 The document thus establishes a link with the nature of conjugal
love and its characterization within scripture and the destructive tendencies
within couples and society when it departs from this model. The implication
is that conjugal love offers a connection with the soul of men and women
with God, and when this connection is violated through the practices named,
disharmony with both God and with each other results.
The Council documents define marriage in such a way that it is linked
expressly with divine law and derives particular responsibilities and benefits
because of this. The definition provided is quite important:
The intimate partnership of life and the love which constitutes the
married state has been established by the creator and endowed by
him with its own proper laws: it is rooted in the contract of its part-
ners, that is, in their irrevocable personal consent. It is an institu-
tion confirmed by the divine law and receiving its stability, even in
the eyes of society, from the human act by which the partners mutu-
ally surrender themselves to each other; for the good of the part-
ners, of the children, and of society this sacred bond no longer
depends on human decision alone. For God himself is author of
marriage and has endowed it with various benefits and with various
ends in view: all these have a very important bearing on the contin-
uation of the human race, on the personal development and eternal
destiny of every member of the family, on the dignity, stability,
peace, and prosperity of the family and of the whole human race.' 0 8
This definition of marriage, involving as it does, the unique involvement
of God, the mutual consent of two persons of the opposite sex, and responsi-
bilities and benefits traditional to the married state, was normative within
statutory and judicial understandings until Baehr v. Lewin.1° 9 For instance,
in rejecting a petition by two men-a single-gender union-which would
have required the clerk of the Superior Court of the District of Columbia to
issue them a marriage license, the Superior Court of the District of Columbia
106. John Paul II, Gadium et spes, supra note 85, at 956.
107. Id. at 949.
108. Id. at 950.
109. 852 P.2d 44 (1993).
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relied upon the historical definition of marriage. 110 Quoting from the opin-
ion of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, the court wrote:
[A]ll definitional sources for "marriage"-the legislative history of
the Marriage and Divorce Act, D.C.Law 1-107, 1977 D.C.Stat. 114;
the various references to gender in relevant provisions of the Dis-
trict of Columbia Code; the common law of the District of Colum-
bia; decisions of appellate courts in other states; references to
marriage in the Bible; and dictionary definitions of "marriage"-
show that marriage inherently requires one male and one female
participant."'
While concurring with the decision to deny the petition of the two men
to be issued a marriage license," 2 Associate Judge Ferren acknowledged in a
separate opinion the crucial definitional role relating to marriage:
[A]lthough the [E]qual [P]rotection [Cilause may not permit the
state to discriminate against homosexuals in some areas, such as em-
ployment, any constitutional concern evaporates when marriage be-
comes the issue simply because marriage is different: It is
conceptually limited by its traditional definition to opposite-sex
couples-a limitation that inherently, therefore, cannot reflect dis-
crimination against homosexual couples in fact or purpose. 113
Many of the definitional elements embraced by the papal documents are
found within the Second Vatican Council documents. For instance, the ele-
ments of commitment and sexuality, and then marriage as a divine covenant
between Christ and the church, are reflected in the following. First, as to
commitment and sexuality:
Married love is an eminently human love because it is an affection
between two persons rooted in the will and it embraces the good of
the whole person; it can enrich the sentiments of the spirit and their
physical expression with a unique dignity and ennoble them as the
special elements and signs of the friendship proper to marriage. 114
110. See Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307 (D.C. App. 1995). For a discussion of
the statutory definition, see id. at 312-15. The Hawaii Supreme Court held that reliance upon
the definition of marriage as a union of one man and one woman to bar same-sex marriage, was
"circular and unpersuasive." Baehr, 852 P.2d at 61.
111. Dean, 653 A.2d at 309-10.
112. See id. The concurring opinion by Judge Ferren would be used extensively in the con-
clusions of law of the Circuit Court of Hawaii when it held, on remand, that the state had failed
to sustain its burden to overcome the presumption that the Hawaii statute denying persons of
single gender the right to marry is unconstitutional by demonstrating or proving that the statute
furthers compelling state interests. See Baehr v. Miike, CIV. No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235 at
*20, 21 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996); see also infra text accompanying notes 281-82.
113. Dean, 653 A.2d at 360 (Ferren, J., concurring). Relying on the analysis of Baehr and its
use of Loving to conclude that the definition of marriage has changed, see Baehr, 852 P.2d at 61,
70, and that a trial is required to determine if same-sex couples comprise a "suspect" class, Judge
Ferren would remand the case for trial on the equal protection issue. See Dean, 653 A.2d at 309.
Likewise, Baehr decided that the state statute violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Ha-
waii state constitution. See Baehr, 852 P.2d at 60.
114. John Paul II, Gaudium et spes, supra note 85, at 952.
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So too, sexuality within marriage is proper and a reflection of the love of
God.
Married love is uniquely expressed and perfected by the exercise of
the acts proper to marriage. Hence the acts in marriage by which
the intimate and chaste union of the spouses takes place are noble
and honorable; the truly human performance of these acts fosters
the self-giving they signify and enriches the spouses in joy and
gratitude. 115
Second, marriage is a sign of the divine covenant between Christ and the
church.
The Christian family, which springs from marriage as a reflection of
the loving covenant uniting Christ with the Church, and as a partici-
pation in that covenant, will manifest to all men the Savior's living
presence in the world, and the genuine nature of the Church. This
the family will do by the mutual love of the spouses, by their gener-
ous fruitfulness, their solidarity and faithfulness, and by the loving
way in which all members of the family work together. 116
The elements defining marriage contained within the Council docu-
ments, as well as those within the papal writings, are enjoined on the bishops
for transmission, not just to the members of the Roman Catholic Church.
The Council makes clear the bishops have a responsibility to "maintain close
relations with the society in which [the Church] lives . . . . [T]he bishops
should make it their special care to approach men and to initiate and pro-
mote dialogue with them.""17 Then,
[liet them explain also how high a value, according to the doctrine
of the Church, should be placed on the human person, on his liberty
and bodily life; how highly we should value the family, its unity and
stability, the procreation and education of children, human society
with its laws and professions, its labor and leisure, its arts and tech-
nical inventions, its poverty and abundance. 118
Within the United States, the National Conference of Catholic Bishops
and the United States Catholic Conference assist in the teaching and interac-
tion responsibilities of the bishops. 119 They have commented specifically and
generally on the issue of single-gender marriage.
D. American Catholic Bishops
On July 24, 1996, the American Catholic bishops reiterated the defini-
tion of marriage in a statement opposing the legalization of marriage be-
115. Id.
116. Id. at 951-52.
117. Vatican II, Christus Dominus, in VATICAN COUNCIL II: THE CONCILIAR AND POST
CONCILIAR DOCUMENTS 570 (Austin Flannery ed., 1975).
118. Id.
119. A specific example of the teaching responsibility of the bishops in connection with
families is the pamphlet published by the Bishops Committee on Marriage and Family. See
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, FAMILIES AT THE CENTER: A HANDBOOK FOR
PARISH MINISTRY Wrm A FAMILY PERSPECTIVE 1 (1990).
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tween persons of the same sex. They wrote "that marriage is a faithful,
exclusive and lifelong union between one man and one woman joined as hus-
band and wife in an intimate partnership of life and love. This union was
established by God with its own proper laws.' 120 Because of this definitional
obstacle to single-gender unions, the opposition of the bishops to single-gen-
der marriage, "is not an instance of unjust discrimination or animosity to-
wards homosexual persons. ' ' 121 Indeed, the American bishops, as does every
major court decision to date, admonishes against discrimination against
homosexuals. 122 For instance: "[T]he Catholic Church teaches emphatically
that individuals and society must respect the basic human dignity of all per-
sons, including those with a homosexual orientation. Homosexual persons
have a right to and deserve our respect, compassion, understanding and de-
fense against bigotry, attacks and abuse.' 23
The bishops who wrote that statement sponsor a vast network of social
agencies throughout the United States. This is of particular importance when
seeking to justify a role of the bishops in contributing to any social policy,
particularly in this regard, a change in the definition of marriage. The Amer-
ican Catholic Church has been particularly involved in the "well-being of so-
ciety" through its extensive and pervasive social agencies. Only recently, the
American Catholic bishops voiced strong and consistent opposition to both
enactment by Congress and signing by President Clinton of welfare legisla-
tion which ended cash assistance for many children born out of wedlock. 124
120. Marriage in the Church: "Between One Man and One Woman," CATHOLIC STANDAR",
Sept. 5, 1996, at 12 [hereinafter Marriage in the Church] (quoting from text of the Statement on
Same-Sex Marriage jointly issued by Bishop Joseph L. Charron of Des Moines, Iowa, chairman
of the Committee on Marriage and Family of the National Conference of Catholic Bishops, and
Bishop William S. Skylstad of Spokane, Washington, chairman of the Committee on Domestic
Policy of the United States Catholic Conference).
121. Id. The definitional aspect of marriage is a crucial factor in rejecting concerns that
denial of the status of marriage to homosexual persons is discriminatory. Indeed, the Hawaii
decision in Baehr v. Lewin even states that "'homosexual' and 'same-sex' marriages are not
synonymous .... Parties to a same-sex marriage could theoretically be either homosexuals or
heterosexuals." See Baehr, 852 P.2d at 52 n.11.
122. See generally, Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307 (D.C. App. 1995) (Ferren, J.,
concurring) (giving excellent synopsis of current decisions and articles).
123. Marriage in the Church, supra note 120.
124. See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, 42
U.S.C. § 1305 (1996). See generally Faye Fiore & Jeffrey L. Rabin, U.S. Welfare Revision Could
Be Costly to L.A. Assistance: Denying Aid to Legal Immigrants Might Add $300 Million to
County Burden. Clinton May Veto Measure, L.A.TMES, July 22, 1996, at Al; Mark Gladstone,
Panel Begins to Assess Impact of Welfare Changes, L.A.Tumns, Aug. 15, 1996, at A3; David Gon-
zalez, Bishops Assail Rule Hostile to Immigrants, N.Y. TIvES, Nov. 18, 1994, at A21; Jane Gross,
For Many on Welfare, Obstacles to Jobs Abound Transition: Lack of Basic Skills, English Profi-
ciency and-as ONE Working Mother Puts lt-'Life Training' Are Just A Few of the Barriers,
L.A.TIMEs, Aug. 4, 1996, at B1; Dana Milbank, Children's Defense Fund and Its Lauded Leader
Lose Clout as Social Policy Shifts to the States, WALL ST. J., May 28, 1996, at A28; Robert Pear,
Catholic Bishops Challenge Pieces of Welfare Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 1995, at Al; Peter
Steinfels, Beliefs, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 1993, at A9.
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The bishops also opposed restricting benefits for legal immigrants. 12 5 And
they have been consistent in this approach 126 even though President Clinton
recently signed the legislation allowing the states, through block grants, to
sharply reduce financial assistance to mothers, their children, and legal
immigrants.127
It is important to see the connection the bishops envision between the
definition of family and the concern they have over the social difficulties fac-
ing American society. They are serving as moral critics of a society which
differs from what the Pope has envisioned as the necessary connection be-
tween the body and the soul as a reflection of God. They write about the
particular danger of wealth:
More studies are needed to probe the possible connections between
affluence and family and marital breakdowns. The constant seeking
for self-gratification and the exaggerated individualism of our age,
spurred on by false values often seen in advertising and on televi-
sion, contribute to the lack of firm commitment in marriage and to
destructive notions of responsibility and personal growth.128
They also write of the general breakdown of social structure and its effect
upon the family:
A breakdown of family life often brings with it hardship and pov-
erty. Divorce, failure to provide support to mothers and children,
abandonment of children, pregnancies out of wedlock, all contrib-
ute to the amount of poverty among us. Though these breakdowns
of marriage and the family are more visible among the poor, they do
not affect only that one segment of our society. In fact, one could
argue that many of these breakdowns come from the false values
found among the more affluent-values which ultimately pervade the
whole of society.' 29
Both of these examples, the particular dilemma of wealth and the tech-
nology it spawns and the general breakdown of social structure, appear
within the bishops approach to pregnancy by teenagers, a devastating prob-
lem in America. The final report of the National Commission on Children,
Beyond Rhetoric,130 has a bleak picture of many American children:
125. See, e.g., Charles Wheeler & Josh Bernstein, Welfare Bill Impacts Immigrants the Hard-
est, Press Release, CATH. LEGAL IMMIGR. NETWORK, INC., Aug. 1996.
126. See, e.g., Rev. J. Bryan Hehir, Testimony on Welfare Reform, in UNITED STATES CATH-
OLIC CONFERENCE, 5 PASTORAL LETTERS OF THE UNITED STATES CATHOLIC BISHOPS 493
(Hugh J. Nolan ed., 1987); Excerpts From the Bishops, N.Y.TIMES, Mar. 19, 1995, at 26; Gonza-
lez, supra note 124, at A21; Pear, supra note 124, at Al.
127. See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, 42
U.S.C. § 1305 (1996).
128. National Conference of Catholic Bishops, Economic Justice for All: Pastoral Letter on
Catholic Social Teaching and the U.S. Economy, in 5 PASTORAL LETTERS OF THE UNITED
STATES CATHOLIC BISHOPS 486 (Hugh J. Nolan ed., 1989).
129. Id.
130. FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON CHILDREN, BEYOND RHETORIC: A
NEW AMERICAN AGENDA FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES (1991) [hereinafter BEYOND RHETO-
Ric]. The National Commission on Children was established by Public Law 100-203 to serve as a
forum on behalf of the children of the nation. It is a bipartisan body whose members were
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Today, one in four children in the United States is raised by just one
parent, usually a divorced or unmarried mother. Many grow up
without the consistent presence of a father in their lives. One of
every five children lives in a family without minimally decent in-
come. Many of these families are desperately poor, with incomes
less than half of the federal poverty level. Each year, half a million
babies are born to teenage girls ill prepared to assume the responsi-
bilities of parenthood. Most of these mothers are unmarried, many
have not completed their education, and few have prospects for an
economically secure future. 131
The report further states that "[iln 1960 only 5 percent of all births in the
United States were to unmarried mothers; in 1988 more than 25 percent
were. Today, more than a million babies each year are born to unmarried
women."132 Ultimately,
[t]he proportion of teenage births that occur outside of marriage has
increased steadily since the early 1970s .... [T]hey are more likely
than girls who delay childbearing to be poor and dependent on wel-
fare .... The cycle of poverty and hopelessness thus continues from
one generation to the next: children of unmarried teenage mothers
are four times as likely as children in other families to be poor, and
they are likely to remain poor for a long time. 133
The report concludes that "[a]mong children living with only their mothers,
sustained poverty for seven or more years is common; among children living
with both parents, it is rare.' 34
The bishops' approach to this problem is first and foremost to call for
sustained economic support for children; by reducing support for pregnant
women and mothers, the new federal welfare legislation diminishes this sup-
port.135 The irony is that while many Americans would support the bishops'
stance of continuing financial assistance to unmarried mothers and their chil-
dren, the support lessens when the bishops criticize school-based programs
for providing contraceptives to unmarried teenagers. There is a connection,
however, between the bishops opposition to the distribution of condoms and
the bishops' reliance on the definition of family as a committed, mutually
supportive, non-individualistic, divinely created institution.
The bishops, because of the definition of family, conclude that condom
distribution programs contribute to the rejection of the values the definition
of marriage promotes. The bishops write:
appointed by the President, the President pro tempore of the U.S. Senate, and the Speaker of
the U.S. House of Representatives. The Commission is required to submit a final report to the
President; to the Committee on Finance and the Committee on Labor and Human Resources of
the Senate; and to the Committees on Ways and Means, Education and Labor, and Energy and
Commerce of the House of Representatives. See id.
131. Id. at 4.
132. Id. at 19.
133. Id. at 33-34.
134. Id. at 83.
135. See generally Ellen L. Bassuk et al., Single Mothers and Welfare, SCIENTI C A MRI-
CAN, Oct. 1996, at 60.
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A school-based program for providing contraceptives to unmarried
teenagers fails to respect teenagers themselves because it takes a
promiscuous lifestyle for granted and resorts to the deception that
premarital sexual activity is without adverse consequences so long
as pregnancy is avoided. This message makes light of the serious
medical, emotional, moral, and spiritual consequences of premature
sexual experimentation. Teenagers are taught to deal with their sex-
uality by suppressing their fertility with drugs and devices, instead
of learning the self-control needed to live in harmony with the pre-
cious gift of sexuality and its power to create new life. The adverse
consequences may include impairment of the ability later in life to
form a lasting and satisfying commitment in marriage. 136
Obviously, for the American Catholic bishops, the definition of family-
its inculcation of mutual surrender of the two parties in a covenant relation-
ship for the good of themselves and for their children, the personal establish-
ment by the Creator and confirmed in divine law-incorporates the sense of
responsibility which the bishops think is needed in society today. For in-
stance, they write: "We know that we [as a society] are called on to be mem-
bers of a new covenant of love. We have to move from our devotion to
independence, to a commitment to human solidarity. That challenge must
find its realization in the kind of community we build among us. '1137 And the
way in which that community is formed-responsibility-begins at an early
age, and it begins through programs and people who emphasize mutual
commitment.
The issue is one of how to define what is best for society, a definition of
family which is immutably drawn from sacred texts and practices of many
generations of religious adherents, a definition which incorporates mutual re-
sponsibility and abjures individual liberty without human solidarity. The
conflict arises between American bishops and many within secular society
over individual elements of this issue. For instance: Why should the defini-
tion of family drawn from sacred texts and incorporated by others impact my
life? Why should mutual responsibility be forced upon me, and to what end?
Is not individual liberty an American ideal, creative and self fulfilling? These
questions form the critical tension within family law in American society, a
society with many religiously affiliated adherents, a society both liberated
and trapped within the cultural advertisement maze of freedom versus
responsibility.
The conflict is seen within the dialogue between Bernard Cardinal Law,
Archbishop of very Catholic Boston, and the mayor of the city, Thomas M.
Menino. Cardinal Law urged the mayor to veto the bill approved by the City
Council which would provide health benefits to the partners of gay and les-
136. National Conference of Catholic Bishops, Statement on School-Based Clinics, in 5 PAS-
TORAL LETTERS OF THE UNITED STATES CATHOLIC BISHOPS 601 (Hugh J. Nolan ed., 1989); see
also PONTIFICAL COUNCIL FOR THE FAMILY, THE TRUTH AND MEANING OF HUMAN SEXUALITY:
GUIDELINES FOR EDUCATION WITHIN THE FAMILY (1996).
137. 5 PASTORAL LETTERS OF THE UNITED STATES CATHOLIC BISHoPS, supra note 136, at
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bian city workers. 138 The Cardinal issued a two page statement supporting
special societal benefits to married persons because, "society has a special
interest in the protection, care and upbringing of children."'1 39 Further, be-
cause "marriage remains the principal, the best, framework for the nurture,
education, and socialization of children, the state has a special interest in
marriage.' 140 For the Cardinal, the definition of marriage, as including the
elements previously noted, provides the divinely established and mutually
covenanted arrangement in which children should be raised. No other ar-
rangement, no matter how functional, can meet this definition. Thus, it
should not be sanctioned by the state which should restrict official sanction to
those relationships defined in accordance with this standard.
Thomas Keane, one of the Boston city councilors who sponsored the
proposal, voiced his opinion that the involvement by church officials is "a
wholly inappropriate mixing of religion and state. This is not a religious is-
sue. This is an issue about civil government.' 14 1 Such a comment by Mr.
Keane is common whenever religion offers a different value perspective. It
fails to incorporate an understanding of religion's role in society, the fact that
religion has a right to impart its view of what is best for society.
More recently, Archbishop William Levada, Archbishop of San Fran-
cisco, had to confront the domestic partnership law which went into effect in
San Francisco in 1991. "Under the law, the city allows couples who have reg-
istered as domestic partners with the city to have visitation rights in hospitals
and if they are city employees, to participate in shared health plans and to
take bereavement leave when a domestic partner dies."'1 42 Three thousand
couples have registered as domestic partners since the law was enacted in
1991.143 Most recently, the city began requiring all who contract with the city
to provide the same spousal benefits to domestic partners as it provides to
the married spouses of its employees. 144 Approximately 40% of the budget
of Catholic Charities, about $5.6 million, comes from the city of San Fran-
cisco. In return, Catholic Charities provides programs to house and feed the
homeless, poor families, and people with the HIV infection and AIDS and
138. See Andrea Estes, Law Lobbies Mayor to Nix Gay Measure, BOSTON HERALD, Mar.
16, 1996, at Al. Other jurisdictions also face challenges from religious leaders over the issue of
benefits which would incorporate relationships outside of the definition of marriage. See, e.g.,
Bob Harvey, Senate Bill On Gays Could Force Federal Action, Tm OTTAWA CrnZEN, Apr. 13,
1996, Citylife at 1 (resisting effort to redefine marriage by Canadian Roman Catholic bishops);
Stephanie Salter, Editorial, Gay Marriage? Same Sex or Not, Let's Honor Love Commitment,
ORLANDO SENrTIL, Apr. 14, 1996 (quoting Archbishop William Levada, Catholic Archbishop
of San Francisco, saying that gay and lesbian marriage contradicts nature and creation).
139. Salter, supra note 138.
140. Id.
141. Estes, supra note 138, at Al.
142. Michael Maloney, Domestic Partners-How It's Done in S.F., S.F. CHRON., Mar. 26,
1996, at Al.
143. See David Tuler, S.F. to Marry 150 Gay Couples, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 23, 1996 at Al.
144. See Don Lattin, S.F. Archbishop Insists He's "Not Anti-Gay;" He Seeks Compromise
on Catholic Charities Contract, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 4, 1997, at A13.
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also job training and mental health counseling.1 45 The issue for the church
and thus the archbishop, was whether the city could force the church to ex-
tend health care benefits to persons not married and living in relationships
which the church regards as sinful.146
The archbishop wrote to the mayor of the city asking for an exemption
from the new law and arguing that forcing Catholic Charities to adopt the
policy of the domestic partnership arrangement would violate the church's
religious and ethical teachings.' 47 The mayor responded that "[i]t was wrong
for the church to interject its views into a governmental matter."148 Leslie
Katz, a city supervisor, argued that Catholic Charities should comply with the
law: "Catholic Charities has the status of a nonprofit charity, not a religious
entity .... They have to choose one or the other. They can't have it both
ways."'1 49 Later, the mayor said that "when it contracts to carry out social
service functions for the city, Catholic Charities is not functioning as a reli-
gious institution but as a nonprofit corporation that must obey the same law
that applies to everyone else.' 150
As in Boston, there is a conflict between what the church sees as best for
society and what elected officials see as best. In the case of San Francisco,
the archbishop and the mayor eventually agreed to a plan that would allow
Catholic Charities to contract with the city and still avoid a purposeful recog-
nition of domestic partnerships. 151 The city and the Archdiocese of San
Francisco agreed to the following language: "[a]n employee may designate a
legally domiciled member of the employee's household as being eligible for
spousal equivalent benefits."'1 5 2 Such language shifted attention from a pos-
sible sexual partner to any legally domiciled member of the household, in-
cluding such persons as a child or a mother or brother. Of course this would
145. See id.
146. The issue of individual religious conscience contradicting an exacted state statute was
the subject of a recent California Supreme Court decision. See Smith v. Fair Employment and
Hous. Comm'n, 913 P.2d 909 (1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 2531 (1997). A landlord, a member
of the Bidwell Presbyterian Church, refused to rent an apartment she owned to an unmarried
couple and the city found her in violation of the statute which prohibited discrimination based
on marital status. When the landlord sought to justify her refusal on the basis of her firmly held
religious beliefs, the court did not exempt her from the ordinance because the right of free
exercise does not relieve an individual from complying with a valid and neutral law of general
applicability. See id. at 918.
147. See Edward Epstein, Domestic Partners Law Showing Up in Contracts; Some S.F. Ven-
dors Quietly Signing Deals, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 30, 1997, at A13.
148. Id.
149. Don Lattin, S.F Clash Over Partners Law; Prelate Seeks Exemption for Catholic Chari-
ties, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 28, 1997, at Al.
150. Edward Epstein, Mayor Firm on Partners Law; Brown Rejects Prelate's Authority on
Secular Matters, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 29, 1997, at A12.
151. See generally Torri Minton, S.F. Archbishop Agrees to Discuss Partners Policy, S.F.
CHRON., Feb. 7, 1997, at A21; Editorial, Room to Compromise on Domestic Partners, S.F.
CHRON., Apr. 11, 1997, at A24.
152. Minton, supra note 151.
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not exclude a member of the same or opposite sex with whom there was a
sexual relationship. 153
Both domestic partnership disputes, in Boston and San Francisco, are
illustrative of the conflict between a church with views on how the family and
society should function and a secular society, reluctant or hostile, to ac-
cepting any advice. Worse, the religious perspective suffers the perception,
previously described, of being formed in ignorance or simply a private matter
with no consequences to the secular process. This is evident in the comments
of the mayors of both Boston and San Francisco and local administrators
serving the city. This impasse creates a dysfunctional environment.
The extent of this dysfunction is seen within the already cited Beyond
Rhetoric, reports containing myriad statistics and little rhetoric.154 But also,
the United States Catholic Conference, an official organization of the Catho-
lic bishops, has published Putting Children and Families First: A Challenge
for Our Church, Nation, and World. This publication lists the reality of life in
the United States for many-millions-of children:
An estimated 5.5 million U.S. children under twelve are hungry; an-
other 6 million are underfed.
The rate of teenage suicide has tripled in thirty years.
More than 2.5 million children suffer physical, emotional, or sexual
abuse or neglect in one year in the United States.
More teenage boys die of gunshot wounds than from all natural
causes combined.
More than 8 million children are in families without health
insurance. 15 5
It is logical to think that some of the problems listed above exist within
families meeting the definition of marriage espoused by the bishops and
other religious denominations; there is a struggle for the ideal. Nonetheless,
Beyond Rhetoric and other studies suggest that the vast number of children
at risk today are from homes where they are born out of wedlock, separated
from a parent because of divorce, or the family structure has little or no re-
spect for "teaching values and creating the ethical context that is fundamen-
tal to our society and our democracy."'1 56 Again, it is not that a religious
perspective guarantees freedom from responsibility, it is that the religious
153. See Don Lattin, Sunday Interview, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 23, 1997, at 3Z1.
154. BEYOND RHETORIC, supra note 130.
155. UNITED STATES CATHOLIC CONFERENCE, PUTTING CHILDREN AND FAMILIES FIRST 2
(1991).
156. BEYOND RHETORIC, supra note 130, at 360.
The family has primary responsibility for teaching values and creating the ethical con-
text that is fundamental to our society and our democracy. Children learn to love
others by being loved. They learn to respect and value the rights of others by being
respected and valued themselves. They learn to trust when they have unwavering sup-
port from parents and the other adults closest to them. The capacity for understanding
and valuing the feelings of others is present in every child, and it flowers when children
are encouraged to emphasize with others .... From the time they are very young,
children learn responsibility and commitment, freedom and dissent in small, managea-
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perspective offers a historical direction based in history which is both possi-
ble and proven.
Religious perspective may be a dissident and discordant voice in the
marketplace of ideas. It may be operating from a value structure predicated
on religious tenets recognized by only a few in a religiously pluralistic society
or it may be viewed as folly, religion may stumble and even fail. But religion
is there in the midst of it all. This is a crucial point. The religious perspective
is not important because religion itself says it is important. A religious per-
spective is important because it has been around for a very long time: it is
rooted in revelation. In the case of the Roman Catholic Church, it is a tradi-
tion about to enter its third millennium. Second, religion is important be-
cause it has entered and remains within the fray of American social life;
religion is a player. The American Catholic Church is perhaps the largest
private organization in the United States in the dispensation of service to the
very people society has marginalized. Third, religious perspective is impor-
tant because it invokes an international character, advocating positions and
programs responsive to all humankind.
Therefore, the contribution of a religious perspective to family matters,
particularly any change in the definition of marriage, is consequential. The
ability of the courts to dismiss a Virginia trial judge and religious perspective
so quickly in Baehr v. Lewin157 is more a result of the culture of disbelief
than the irrelevance of the perspective.
II. JUDICIAL AcIvIsM
What should be the role of a court, of a judge, of the judicial process?
The Hawaii Supreme Court required a compelling state interest to support
the definition of marriage as one between persons of mixed gender. 158 This
is an important question. This question has had great importance over rights
and responsibilities concerning minorities such as African-Americans, gay
and lesbian persons, women seeking abortions, and those seeking assisted
suicide. Long before any legislative liberties were accorded, these named mi-
norities, the courts-in the beginning, federal courts-discovered these liber-
ties in the Bill of Rights of the United States Constitution.159 Stated simply,
ble steps. Experiences within the family provides them with the moral and ethical
framework for their lives as adults.
Id. at 360-61.
157. 852 P.2d 44, 63 (Haw. 1993) ("With all due respect to the Virginia courts of a bygone
era, we do not believe that trial judges are the ultimate authorities on the subject of Divine Will,
and, as Loving amply demonstrates, constitutional law may mandate, like it or not, that customs
change with an evolving social order.").
158. See id. at 68.
159. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 116 S.Ct. 1620, 1629 (1996) (upholding legislative, executive
and judicial action to protect homosexuals from discrimination as guarantee of equal protec-
tion); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973) (holding right of woman to abortion is right of
personal privacy found within penumbra of Constitution); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12
(1967) (allowing interracial marriages because of equal protection and due process guarantees);
Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 839 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. granted sub nom.
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judges adapted the Bill of Rights to changing societies and developed from
objective rights an applicability which applied to changing subjective situa-
tions. Because state or federal statutes were affected, laws came into being
with aid of the legislative process, and sometimes laws were simply aban-
doned. This practice by judges is often called judicial activism.
The late Justice William Brennan, who served on the Supreme Court
from 1956 until his retirement in 1990, is seen by many as a proponent of
judicial activism. For Brennan "[tihe Constitution was designed to place fun-
damental rights 'beyond the reach of temporary political majorities." ' 160
Throughout his tenure on the Court, Justice Brennan's judicial philosophy
was captured in the constantly used phrase "dignity of every person. '"161
When confronted by a government of these temporary political majorities,
"the meaning of the Constitution must change as society changes. Judges
speak for a community that is diverse and disputatious, and they must step in
to prevent majorities, permanent or temporary, from trampling on the rights
of minorities.' '1 62
The opposite of this approach could be called the American form of pos-
itivism, which would give "judges an independent but limited role in review-
ing laws, constrained by precedent and the constitutional text."'1 63 Chief
Justice Rehnquist is, along with other justices on the Court, aligned more
with the positivistic approach to decision making. The Chief Justice "has
voted more consistently to uphold governmental actions, legislative and exec-
utive. And none [of the justices] has voted more consistently against the
claims of dissenters and minorities. His 'deference' principle stands in stark
contrast to the 'dignity' value of Justice Brennan."'164
Incorporated into the legal process, which affects the balance between
judicial activism and judicial positivism, is the inclusion of the concept of
"strict scrutiny" explained first in United States v. Carolene Products Com-
pany.165 Following the Great Depression and just before the Second World
War, the decision had marked importance because a footnote, written more
as an aside, provided increased judicial intervention in non-economic affairs.
The opinion read as follows:
Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 37, rev'd, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997) (holding that laws prohibit-
ing assisted suicide violate Due Process Clause); Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716, 731 (2d Cir. 1996),
rev'd, 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997) (holding that laws prohibiting assisted suicide violate Equal Protec-
tion Clause).
160. PETER IRONS, BRENNAN VS. REHNOUIST: THE BATTLE FOR THE CONSTITUTION 37
(1994) [hereinafter BRENNAN vs. REHNQUnST].
161. Id. at 38. Brennan uses the word "dignity" in more than 30 opinions. See id. at xi.
162. Id. at 39.
163. Id. at 62.
164. Id. at 64.
165. 304 U.S. 144 (1938). For a critique, see Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Prod-
ucts, 98 HARv. L. REv. 713 (1985); Lea Brilmayer, Carolene, Conflicts, and the Fate of the "In-
side-Outsider," 134 U. PA. L. REv. 1291 (1986); Laurence Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of
Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L. J. 1063 (1980). For a comprehensive theory




[L]egislation which restricts those political processes which can or-
dinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation,
[may] be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny under the gen-
eral prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment .... [S]imilar con-
siderations [may] enter into the review of statutes directed at
particular religious .. .national . . . or racial minorities . . .[and]
prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special
condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those
political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities,
and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial
inquiry.166
These words inaugurated strict scrutiny, an approach "most powerfully
employed for the examination of political outcomes challenged as injurious
to those groups in society which have occupied, as a consequence of wide-
spread, insistent prejudice against them, the position of perennial losers in
the political struggle."'1 67 Some were identified individually, such as racial,
religious and national minorities; some were openly defined, such as the dis-
crete and insular minorities broadly identified in Carolene. Nonetheless, all
share "a close and complex relationship with notions of fundamental
rights."'1 68 The notions of "suspect classifications" and "conclusive presump-
tions" have a commonality with the issue of "fundamental," such as the right
to bodily integrity or the right to be heard in one's own defense, 169 and the
practical effect was to turn the "presumption of constitutionality" against
laws affecting such groups. 170 Thus, a compelling state interest was required
when laws denied fundamental rights to any person or created a suspect class
for any minority group.17 1
These judicial notions of suspect class, fundamental rights, and compel-
ling state interest are not contained within the "positive" language of the
United States Constitution. Their use by the courts creates a tension be-
tween those persons seeking to uphold the positive language of the Bill of
Rights and those persons seeking to provide a functional approach to what
the language was intended to mean. The tension is exasperated by the
Supreme Court's lack of candor as to when heightened scrutiny and espe-
cially, intermediate scrutiny, is to be used. 172 Indeed, in Employment Divi-
sion, Department of Human Resources v. Smith,173 the Court held that the
166. 304 U.S. at 152-53 n.4 (citations omitted).
167. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITrrIONAL LAW 1453-54 (2d ed. 1988). The
argument is made that gay and lesbian persons have significant political clout within America.
See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1637 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("It is nothing short
of preposterous to call 'politically unpopular' a group which enjoys enormous influence in
America media and politics, and which.., though composing no more than 4% of the popula-
tion had the support of 46% of the voters ... .
168. TRIBE, supra note 167, at 1454.
169. Id. at 1590.
170. BRENNmAN vs. REHNOUIST, supra note 160, at 76.
171. See id. at 77.
172. See TRIBE, supra note 167, at 1610-25.
173. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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compelling state interest test was inapplicable to free exercise (religious)
challenges to criminal prohibitions. 174 The tension and the resulting congres-
sional action in the form of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, is a typi-
cal example of the conflict between those who wish to retain the original
words of the Constitution as an objective, positive rule of law, and those who
wish to fashion the words to accommodate changing situations. 175 It should
come as no surprise that the majority opinion in Smith was written by Associ-
ate Justice Antonin Scalia, noted for his "positive" interpretation of the
Constitution.
Recently, Justice Scalia wrote an essay about his belief in a philosophy of
interpretation best described as "textualism." He elaborates:
Textualism should not be confused with so-called strict construc-
tionism, a degraded form of textualism that brings the whole philos-
ophy into dispute. I am not a strict constructionist, and no one
ought to be-though better that, I suppose, than a nontextualist. A
text should not be construed strictly, and it should not be construed
leniently; it should be construed reasonably, to contain all that it
fairly means.176
How textualism best preserves democracy and thus avoids the tempta-
tion of non-elected judges to create rights and realities when none exist in the
text, is illustrated in an example provided by Justice Scalia. The example
concerns women voting rights and is analogous to the gender issues presently
being litigated in Baehr. Justice Scalia writes:
Seventy-five years ago, we believed firmly enough in a rock-solid,
unchanging Constitution that we felt it necessary to adopt the Nine-
teenth Amendment to give women the [right to] vote. The battle
was not fought in the courts, and few thought it could be, despite
the constitutional guarantees of Equal Protection of the Laws; that
provision did not, when it was adopted, and hence did not in 1920,
guarantee equal access to the ballot but permitted distinctions on
the basis of not only age but of property and of sex. Who can doubt
that if the issue had been deferred until today, the Constitution
would be (formally) unamended, and the courts would be the cho-
sen instrumentality of change? The American people have been
converted to belief in The Living Constitution, a "morphing" docu-
ment that means, from age to age, what it ought to mean. And with
that conversion has inevitably come the new phenomenon of select-
ing and confirming federal judges, at all levels, on the basis of their
174. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 889-90. See generally Raymond C. O'Brien & Michael T. Flan-
nery, The Pending Gauntlet to Free Exercise: Mandating That Clergy Report Child Abuse, 25
LOYOLA L.A. L. Rav. 1 (1991).
175. Religious Freedom Restoration Act § 2, 42 U.S.C. 2000bb-2000bb-4 (1993). The Act,
which requires government to demonstrate that law substantially burdening free exercise of reli-
gion is the least restrictive means available to further compelling state interest, is a valid exercise
of Congress' power under Section 5 of Fourteenth Amendment. See Sasnett v. Sullivan, 91 F.3d
1018, 1022 (7th Cir. 1996) vacated, 117 S. Ct. 2502 (1997).
176. Antonin Scalia, A MATrER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW
23 (1997).
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views regarding a whole series of proposals for constitutional evolu-
tion. If the courts are free to write the Constitution anew, they will,
by God, write it the way the majority wants; the appointment and
confirmation process will see to that. This, of course, is the end of
the Bill of Rights, whose meaning will be committed to the very
body it was meant to protect against: the majority. By trying to
make the Constitution do everything that needs doing from age to
age, we have caused it to do nothing at all. 177
Single-gender marriage and the Hawaii decision of Baehr v. Lewin are
heirs to the tension resulting from suspect classification, discrete and insular
minorities, fundamental rights and levels of scrutiny. For instance, when the
plaintiffs filed their petition in the Hawaii circuit court, they proclaimed
"their homosexuality and [asserted] a fundamental constitutional right to sex-
ual orientation .... [Plaintiffs] reiterated their position that the DOH's re-
fusal to issue marriage licenses to the applicant couples violated their rights
to privacy, equal protection of the laws, and due process of law under article
I, section 5 and 6 of the Hawaii Constitution."' 178 While the Hawaii Supreme
Court dismissed the relevance of homosexuality as to the issue presented and
concentrated instead on state regulation of same-sex couples, the following
quote from the court's decision is illustrative of the use of judicially-created
paradigms:
[T]he issue [of homosexuality] is not material to the equal protec-
tion analysis set forth .... Its resolution is unnecessary to our rul-
ing that [the statute], both on its face as applied, denies same-sex
couples access to the marital status and its concomitant rights and
benefits. Its resolution is also unnecessary to our conclusion that it
is the state's regulation of access to the marital status, on the basis
of applicants' sex, that gives rise to the question whether the appli-
cant couples have been denied the equal protection of the laws in
violation of article I, section 5 of the Hawaii Constitution .... And,
in particular, it is immaterial to the exercise of "strict scrutiny" re-
view, . . . inasmuch as we are unable to perceive any conceivable
relevance of the issue to the ultimate conclusion of law-which, in
the absence of further evidentiary proceedings, we cannot reach at
this time-regarding whether [the statute] furthers compelling state
interests and is narrowly drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgments
of constitutional rights.179
The Hawaii Supreme Court, as a state court, would continue to incorpo-
rate the words and phrases which have been traditionally associated with ju-
177. Id. at 47.
178. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 52 (Haw. 1993). Note that the Hawaii Supreme Court
finds it "irrelevant, for purposes of the constitutional analysis germane to this case, whether
homosexuality constitutes 'an immutable trait' because it is immaterial whether the plaintiffs, or
any of them, are homosexuals." See id. at 54 n. 14. For a discussion of immutability and sexual
orientation, see CHANDLER BURR, A SEPARATE CREATION: THE SEARCH FOR THE BIOLOGI-
CAL ORIGINS OF SEXUAL ORIENTATION (1996); SIMON LEVAY, QUEER SCIENCE: THE USE AND
ABUSE OF RESEARCH INTO HOMOSEXUALITY (1996).
179. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 53 n.14.
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dicial activism in the federal courts. 180 For example, the court stated that the
right of privacy is recognized expressly in the Hawaii Constitution, and that it
shall not be infringed without a showing of a compelling state interest and it
is to be treated as a fundamental right.' 8 ' And "[i]t would make little sense
to recognize a right of privacy with respect to other matters of life and not
with respect to the decision to enter the relationship that is the foundation of
the family in society.' 82 "Therefore, the precise question facing this court is
whether we will extend the present boundaries of the fundamental right of
marriage to include same-sex couples, or, put another way, whether we will
hold that same-sex couples possess a fundamental right to marry."'1 83
While the court concluded that "the applicant couples do not have a
fundamental constitutional right to same-sex marriage arising out of the right
to privacy or otherwise . . -'11184 the court did find that the applicant couple
was denied equal protection under the Hawaii State Constitution:185 "It is
the state's regulation of access to the status of married persons, on the basis
of the applicant's sex, that gives rise to the question whether the applicant
couples have been denied the equal protection of the laws .... ,,186 The court
held that the couples were denied equal protection of the law as a result of
sex-based classification. Furthermore, "sex-based classifications are subject,
as a per se matter, to some form of 'heightened' scrutiny, be it 'strict' or
'intermediate,' rather than the mere 'rational basis' analysis.' 87 Most crucial
to the holding, the court wrote:
[W]e hold that, sex is a "suspect category" for purposes of equal
protection analysis under ... [the Hawaii State Constitution] ...
and that [the state statute] is ... subject to the "strict scrutiny" test.
It therefore follows, and we so hold, that [the statute] is presumed
to be unconstitutional.., unless [the state] ... can show that (a) the
statute's sex-based classification is justified by compelling state in-
terests and (b) the statute is narrowly drawn to avoid unnecessary
abridgements of the applicant couples' constitutional rights.188
180. The court rejected the notion that it was engaging in judicial activism, implying instead
that it was simply interpreting the Hawaii State Constitution. See id. at 68 ("In effect, we are
being accused of engaging in judicial legislation. We are not.").
181. See id. at 55.
182. Id. at 56.
183. Id. at 56-57.
184. Id. at 57.
185. See id. at 59.
186. Id. at 60.
187. Id. at 65. For a recent example of judicial application of fundamental right to marry
principles, see Shahar v. Bowers, 836 F. Supp. 859 (N.D. Ga. 1993). In this Georgia case, a
lesbian woman sued the state attorney general after he withdrew his offer of employment after it
was alleged he discovered her single-gender marriage. She petitioned the court for redress argu-
ing that his dismissal of her violated her fundamental right to marry. See id. An Eleventh Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals panel reversed the trial court and remanded the case for a strict scrutiny
review and this was vacated by the full circuit and set for an en banc hearing. See Shahar v.
Bowers, 78 F.3d 499, 500 (11th Cir. 1996).
188. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 67.
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Because of this particular holding, the case was remanded to the trial court to
allow the state to comply with the court's demand that it provide both a com-
pelling state interest and demonstrate that the statute is narrowly drawn.
189
Almost from the start, arguments were made concerning the judicial ac-
tivism of the Hawaii Supreme Court. Critics argued that the court, through
the use of words such as fundamental right, strict scrutiny, compelling state
interest and suspect classification, was legislating or judicially acting within
an arena reserved for duly elected officials. 190 The court responded to this
criticism by stating that its decision was based on its ability to interpret the
state constitution. "The result we reach today is in complete harmony with
the Loving court's observation that any state's powers to regulate marriage
are subject to the constraints imposed by the constitutional right to equal
protection of the laws."'191 Then adding as an aside the court explained, "[i]f
the provisions of the Constitution be not upheld when they pinch as well as
when they comfort, they may as well be abandoned."' 192
While few would deny a court's ability to interpret the Constitution in
accordance with the power reserved within the often-quoted decision of Mar-
bury v. Madison,193 more would complain of the court's use of judicially-
created classifications to reject validly enacted state legislation. Indeed,
some would describe such activity as an imposition by an elite class upon the
rest,194 and furthermore, deem any consideration of sex-based classifications,
as "no business of the courts" as opposed to the political branches. 195 The
bottom line is that religion must be accommodated within American life and
through judicial interpretation by a few, as opposed to legislative decision-
making by many.196
189. See id. at 68. Thomas P. Gill, Chairperson of the State Commission on Sexual Orienta-
tion and the Law, stated that "the opposition [to single-gender marriage] can't come up with a
compelling state interest other than Leviticus 18." David A. Dunlap, Panel in Hawaii Recom-
mends Legalizing Same-Sex Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 1995, at A18.
190. See, e.g., Baehr, 852 P.2d at 70-74 (Heen, J., dissenting).
191. Id. at 68.
192. Id.
193. 5 U.S. 137 (1803). Marbury v. Madison was the first case where the Supreme Court
asserted that a federal court has power to refuse to give effect to congressional legislation if it is
inconsistent with the Court's interpretation of the Constitution. For an example of judicial re-
sponsibility, see Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 836 (9th Cir. 1996), cert.
granted sub nom. Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 37 (1996) ("Weighing and then balancing
a constitutionally-protected interest against the state's countervailing interests, while bearing in
mind the various consequences of the decision, is quintessentially a judicial role." ).
194. See Romer v. Evans, 116 S.Ct. 1620, 1629 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting). "When the
Court takes sides in the culture wars, it tends to be with the knights rather than with the...
Templars, reflecting the views and values of the lawyer class from which the Court's Members
are drawn." Id. at 1637.
195. Id. (referring to heterosexual monogamy as opposed to polygamous cohabitation).
196. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (holding that city of Pawtucker did not
violate Establishment Clause by including creche in its Christmas display); Marsh v. Chambers,
463 U.S. 783 (1983) (holding that Nebraska legislature's chaplaincy practice does not violate
Establishment Clause); JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., THE BELIEVER AND THE POWERs THAT ARE:
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The judicial controversy created over assisted suicide is another example
of asserted judicial activism. Compassion in Dying v. State of Washington,197
held that the provision of the Washington state statute which prohibited aid-
ing another person to commit suicide violated the Due Process Clause as
applied to terminally ill patients who wished to hasten their own death with
medications prescribed by their physicians.198 The court noted the similarity
between assisted suicide and abortion cases by stating that "they present is-
sues of. . . profound spiritual importance ... because they so deeply affect
[the] individual's right to determine their own destiny ....
Implying its ability to interpret and apply the Constitution to changing
circumstances, the court noted, "[i]n all cases, our analysis of the applicability
of the protections of the Constitution must be made in light of existing cir-
cumstances as well as our historic traditions. ' '200 Further, the court also
noted that "[s]triving to assure itself and the public that announcing rights
not readily identifiable in the Constitution's text involves much more than
the imposition of the Justices' own choice of values on the states and the
Federal Government .... -201
The Ninth Circuit Court goes to considerable lengths to justify its ability
to correctly interpret the times and to refrain from imposing its own value
choices on others. For instance, the court begins its analysis with Greek and
Roman times,202 then early Christian and the traditional English experi-
ence,20 3 and finally the current social attitudes evidenced by polls and recent
court decisions.20 4 The court also answers the criticism that it should leave
decisions such as assisted suicide to the legislatures, by writing that it is doing
just that, but one step better. The court is "permitting the individual to exer-
cise the right to choose[,] ... to take such decisions out of the hands of the
government, both state and federal, and put them where they rightly belong,
in the hands of the people. '20 5 But in the end, the court acknowledges,
"[w]eighing and then balancing a constitutionally-protected interest against
the state's countervailing interests, while bearing in mind the various conse-
MENrr (1987); Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation in Religion: An Update and a Response
to the Critics, 60 GEO. WASH. L. Rav. 685 (1992); Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a
Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 115 (1992); Michael W. McConnell, Neutrality Under the Reli-
gious Clauses, 81 Nw. U. L. REV. 146 (1986); John T. Noonan, The Constitution's Protection of
Individual Rights: The Real Role of the Religion Clauses, 49 U. Prrr. L. REV. 717 (1988).
197. 79 F.3d 790.
198. See id. at 793-94. The due process interest concerns the liberty interest a person has in
determining the time and manner of one's own death. Because the Washington state statute
prohibits aid by another in the prescription of life-ending medication for use by terminally ill,
competent adult patients who wish to hasten their deaths, the statute violates due process. The
court does not address whether the statute then violates equal protection. See id. at 798.
199. Id. at 801.
200. Id. at 803.
201. Id. (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191-92 (1986)).
202. See id. at 806-07. But see id. at 845-47 (Beezer, J., dissenting).
203. See id. at 808-09.
204. See id. at 810-16.
205. Id. at 839.
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quences of the decision, is quintessentially a judicial role."206 At some point,
"mindful of our constitutional obligations, including the limitations imposed
on us by that document, we must rely on our judgement, guided by the facts
and the law as we perceive them. '20 7 Clearly, the court is in control.
In a lengthy dissent, Circuit Judge Beezer contradicts the history and the
dismissal by the majority of the state's interest. He finds four rational pur-
poses to the state statute: (1) preserving life, (2) protecting the interest of
innocent third parties, (3) preventing suicide, and (4) the ethical integrity of
the medical profession. 20 8 For him these interests are dispositive, since, "[i]f
the liberty interest is not fundamental, the statute is subjected only to the
'unexacting' inquiry of whether the statute rationally advances some legiti-
mate governmental purpose. ' '2 °9 For him the state statute is rational; it has
met the test. Impliedly, by holding the statute unconstitutional, the court has
raised the standard on its own to more than rationality. Indeed, the court is
finding within the constitution a right to suicide. As Circuit Judge Fernandez
writes in a separate dissent, this is not something for the courts to discover, it
is for the people and their elected representatives to decide.210 Circuit Judge
Kleinfeld was more to the point:
Suicide has not been traditionally or historically protected as a right
.... That a question is important does not imply that it is constitu-
tional. The Founding Fathers did not establish the United States as
a democratic republic so that elected officials would decide trivia,
while all great questions would be decided by the judiciary ....
People of varying views, including people with terrible illnesses and
their relatives, physicians, and clergy, can, through democratic insti-
tutions, obtain enlightened compromises of the complex and con-
flicting considerations. They can do at least as well as we judges
can, and nothing in the Constitution prevents then from making the
law.21 1
Agreeing with the dissent and thus rejecting the Ninth Circuit's discov-
ery of a liberty interest to commit suicide within the Due Process Clause,
Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for the majority of the Supreme Court:
[W]e "ha[ve] always been reluctant to expand the concept of sub-
stantive due process because guideposts for responsible decision-
making in this unchartered area are scarce and open-ended."
[Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992)]. By extending
constitutional protection to an asserted right or liberty interest, we,
to a great extent, place the matter outside the arena of public de-
bate and legislative action. We must therefore "exercise the utmost
care whenever we are asked to break new ground in this field," ibid,
lest the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause be subtly trans-
206. Id. at 836.
207. See id. at 836.
208. See id. at 839 (Beezer, J., dissenting).
209. Id. at 855.
210. See id. at 857 (Fernandez, J., dissenting).
211. Id. at 858-59 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
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formed into the policy preferences of the members of this Court,
[Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 502 (1977) (plurality
opinion)]. 212
This decision returned the debate over assisted suicide to the legislative pro-
cess in the State of Washington.
The second example of asserted judicial activism is Quill v. Vacco.2 13 On
the other side of the country, in New York, the Second Circuit held that a
state statute prohibiting assisted suicide violated the Equal Protection Clause
of the United States Constitution. Nonetheless, the court did not find that
there was a fundamental right to assisted suicide in the constitution, relying
on the fact that the "Supreme Court has drawn a line, albeit a shaky one, on
the expansion of fundamental rights that are without support in the text of
the constitution. '2 14 As with Compassion in Dying, the Court reiterated his-
torical precedent, discussed the basis of rational review, intermediate, and
strict scrutiny, and concluded that the statutes lack any rational basis.2 15
The denial of equal protection comes about in the following way:
[T]hose in the final stages of terminal illness who are on life-support
systems are allowed to hasten their deaths by directing the removal
of such systems; but those who are similarly situated, except for the
previous attachment of life sustaining equipment, are not allowed to
hasten death by self-administered prescribing drugs.216
While a state could sustain the difference through a rational reason, the court
concluded that the "state's interest lessens as the potential for life dimin-
ishes" and there were no state interests which met the criteria of rationality
for the court. 217 Thus, the state statute was declared unconstitutional.
In a concurring opinion, the former dean of the Yale Law School, now
Circuit Judge Calabresi, agreed that the statutes were unconstitutional, but
thought the issue of whether they violated equal protection or due process
should not be decided at this time. He wrote:
I contend that when a law is neither plainly unconstitutional (be-
cause in derogation of one of the express clauses or our fundamen-
tal charter or, for that matter, of the more general clauses, as these
have been interpreted in our constitutional history and traditions),
nor plainly constitutional, the courts ought not to decide the ulti-
mate validity of that law without current and clearly expressed
statements, by the people or by their elected officials, of the state
interests involved.2 18
Nonetheless, Circuit Judge Calabresi continued:
[W]hether under Equal Protection, or Due Process ... the absence
of a recent, affirmative, lucid and unmistakable statement of why a
212. Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2267-68 (1997).
213. 80 F.3d 716 (2d Cir. 1996), rev'd, Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997).
214. Id. at 724.
215. See id. at 726-27.
216. Id. at 729.
217. Id. (citations omitted).
218. Id. at 738 (Calabresi, J., concurring).
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state wishes to interfere with what has been held by the Supreme
Court to be a significant individual right, dooms these statutes ....
[N]o court need or ought to make ultimate and immensely difficult
constitutional decisions unless it knows that the state's elected rep-
resentatives and executives .. .assert through their actions (not
their inactions) that they really want and are prepared to defend
laws that are constitutionally suspect. 219
Again writing for the majority of the Supreme Court, Chief Justice
Rehnquist rejected the Second Circuit's conclusion that New York state's
prohibition of assisted suicide violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.220 Writing that there is no violation of equal pro-
tection, the Chief Justice noted that "the overwhelming majority of state leg-
islatures have drawn a clear line between assisting suicide and withdrawing or
permitting the refusal of unwanted lifesaving medical treatment by prohibit-
ing the former and permitting the latter."'221 The debate was thus returned to
the New York state legislature and withdrawn from judicial decisionmaking.
Judicial activism is not purposefully exclusionary; it is functionally exclu-
sionary. That is, since the vast majority of judges are neither elected, nor
subject to recall, the judiciary is not subject to the democratic process of poli-
tics and having to answer to a majority of the people at given times and
places. Inasmuch as the courts, through decisions such as Compassion in
Dying v. State of Washington and then Vacco v. Quill, departed from a deeply
rooted principle of prolongation of life because life is decidedly important,222
the courts deprived religious and other advocates in the political process of a
voice through the legislative process. Religious accommodation is lacking.
This can also be said of the privacy right of a woman to terminate her preg-
nancy as in Roe v. Wade,22 3 and the discovery of the right of privacy as in
Griswold v. Connecticut,224 and the recent decision in the Hawaii State
Supreme Court, Baehr v. Lewin.225 Each of these decisions has prompted
219. Id. at 741-42.
220. See Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct 2293, 2296 (1997).
221. Id. at 2300 (citing Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2262-63, 2265-67).
222. Id., at 2293, the concurring opinion of Justice Stevens, identifying the historical impor-
tance of human life:
History and tradition provide ample support for refusing to recognize an open-ended
constitutional right to commit suicide. Much more than the State's paternalistic inter-
est in protecting the individual from the irrevocable consequences of an ill-advised de-
cision motivated by temporary concerns is at stake. There is truth in John Donne's
observation that "No man is an island." The State has an interest in preserving and
fostering the benefits that every human being may provide to the community-a com-
munity that thrives on the exchange of ideas, expressions of affection, shared memories
and humorous incidents as well as on the material contributions that its members create
and support. The value to others of a person's life is far too precious to allow the
individual to claim a constitutional entitlement to complete autonomy in making a deci-
sion to end that life.
Id. at 2305 (Stevens, J., concurring).
223. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
224. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
225. 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
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intense political debate and often heated legislative reaction.226 In the cases
of Compassion in Dying v. State of Washington and Vacco v. Quill, the
Supreme Court of the United States was prompted to reverse the holdings,
allowing the states to continue the debate without judicial interference. In
her concurring opinion, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor wrote:
There is no reason to think the democratic process will not strike
the proper balance between the interests of terminally ill, mentally
competent individuals who would seek to end their suffering and
the State's interest in protecting those who might seek to end life
mistakenly or under pressure. As the Court recognizes, States are
presently undertaking extensive and serious evaluation of physician-
assisted suicide and other related issues.227
The fact that the court has devised levels of scrutiny to facilitate judicial
activism only exacerbates the situation. If the right in question is so funda-
mental to individual liberty, and considered so restricted in comparison to
other rights that the restriction is seen as a denial of equal protection, why
has there not been a political call for change by the group so affected? This
question is particularly pertinent when asked in the context of women, who
form a majority of American voters, and even in the context of the elderly,
who form a rapidly expanding and cohesive voting population in America. If
at all, the practice of judicial establishment of levels of scrutiny finds reasona-
bleness in the context of racial minorities who are discrete and insular minor-
ities. This practice is understandable when seen in the racial context applied
to the footnote in the Supreme Court's 1938 decision of United States v.
Carolene Products Company.228
The Court's 1967 racial decision in Loving v. Virginia229 was within the
parameters of Carolene Products. Baehr seeks to apply heightened scrutiny
to single-gender unions (not homosexual unions). The court argued that they
should find equal protection within suspect classification or quasi-suspect
classification 230 because "sex is a 'suspect category' for purposes of equal
protection analysis under article I, section 5 of the Hawaii Constitution
.... ",231 This is a judicial leap, made more palatable because it is confined to
the Hawaii state constitution, but nonetheless, not within the intent of "dis-
226. See, e.g., Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (codified as
amended at 1 U.S.C.A. §7; 28 U.S.C.A. §1738(C) (West Supp. 1997)); Lisa M. Farabee, Note,
Marriage, Equal Protection, and New Judicial Federalism: A View From the States, 14 YALE L. &
POL'Y RaV. 237 (1996); Keane, supra note 62. Candance L. Sage, Note, Sister-State Recognition
of Valid Same-Sex Marriages: BAEHR v. LEWIN-How Will It Play In Peoria?, 28 IND. L. REv.
115 (1994).
227. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2303 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
228. 504 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (stating that Justice Stone provided insular and discrete minori-
ties may warrant more searching judicial inquiry).
229. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
230. See, e.g., Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982); Craig v. Boren,
429 U.S. 190 (1976). The state must demonstrate that legislative use of "the classification reflects
a reasoned judgment consistent with the ideal of equal protection .... " See Plyler v. Doe, 457
U.S. 202, 217-18 (1982).
231. See Baehr, 852 P.2d at 67.
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crete and insular minorities" if the basis is solely on gender. And if the basis
is one of sexual orientation, the Supreme Court has not addressed the issue
of whether or not homosexual couples constitute a suspect or a quasi-suspect
classification. 232 At most, a federal district court in the southern district of
Ohio has held that homosexuals and bisexuals comprise a quasi-suspect class
of persons.233 Thus, the Hawaii court is dodging the obvious, that homosexu-
als are not within the ambit of Carolene Products, and utilization of gender
equivalents stretches the limits of tolerance of judicial review.
III. THE DECISION: BAEHR V. LEwfN
The Hawaii decision should be seen in context. The area of family law
has long been dominated by traditional American notions of what constitutes
a family. These notions were primarily influenced by the historical and inter-
national tradition of Judeo-Christian practices. By requiring the state to
show a compelling reason why persons of the same gender should not be
allowed to marry, Baehr is a dramatic shift away from these traditional
Judeo-Christian practices. Such shifts have been occurring at the local level
for decades, 234 with only minimal public reaction. Until Baehr, the public
had largely perceived these changes as based on individual liberty, rather
than on a comprehensive plan to replace the Judeo-Christian underpinnings
of family law. However, the Hawaii decision captured the attention of the
232. See Rowland v. Mad River Local Sch. Dist., 470 U.S. 1009, 1014 (1985) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (asserting "discrimination against homosexuals or bisexuals based solely on their sex-
ual preference raises significant constitutional questions under both prongs of our settled equal
protection analysis"). But see Watkins v. United States Army, 875 F.2d 699, 724-28 (9th Cir.
1989) (en banc) (Norris, J., concurring) (stating homosexuals comprise suspect class); see also
David K. Flaks, Gay and Lesbian Families: Judicial Assumptions, Scientific Realities, 3 WM. &
MARY BILL RTs. J. 345 (Summer 1994); Harris M. Miller II, Note, An Argument for the Applica-
tion of Equal Protection Heightened Scrutiny to Classifications Based on Homosexuality, 57 S.
CAL. L. REV. 797 (July 1984); John F. Niblock, Comment, Anti-Gay Initiatives: A Call for Height-
ened Judicial Scrutiny, 41 UCLA L. REV. 153 (Oct. 1993); Note, The Constitutional Status of
Sexual Orientation: Homosexuality as a Suspect Classification, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1285 (Apr.
1985); Stephen Zamansky, Note, Colorado's Amendment 2 and Homosexuals' Right to Equal
Protection of the Law, 35 B.C. L. REV. 221 (Dec. 1993).
233. See Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati Inc. v. Cincinnati, 860 F. Supp. 417, 436
(S.D. Ohio 1994), rev'd and vacated, 128 F.3d 289 (6th Cir. 1997).
234. See, e.g., Braschi v. Stahl Associates Co., 543 N.E.2d 49, 54 (N.Y. 1989) (stating ex-
panded definition of family can include two men living together for ten years where they share
financial and emotional dependency). See generally MILTON C. REGAN, JR., FAMILY LAW AND
THE PURSUIT OF INTIMACY (1993) (shifting focus of marriage to economic partnership of two
equal persons); Raymond C. O'Brien, Domestic Partnership: Recognition and Responsibility, 32
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 163, 175-219 (1995) (tracing past, present and future of domestic partner-
ships); Foreword, Twenty-Five Years of Divorce Resolution, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 1 (introducing
articles written in conjunction with symposium tracing acceptance of no-fault divorce: Twenty-
Five Years of Divorce Revolution).
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media and the public because it was such a radical shift from what the prior
decisions had correctly called "the definition of marriage. '235
What then does the decision bring to the context of family law? First,
remember that the Hawaii case of Baehr is not the first to concern single-
gender unions. 236 In the past the issue was dismissed as beyond the defini-
tion of marriage,237 not as an issue involving discrimination involving due
process, equal protection or any state equal rights amendment. At its es-
sence, "marriage" was seen as involving the possibility of procreation.238
Even without this possibility, the icon of sexual union between a man and a
woman was established in history and practice as normative. This norm was
beyond the capacity of two persons of the same gender and necessarily ex-
cluded them from the idea of marriage. Such an argument, based solely on
the definition established by generations of people and sanctified by biblical
and historical precedent, was both rational and dispository in any legal chal-
lenge. Hawaii changed this rationale.239 Baehr has as its premise the propo-
sition that times have changed and thus so has the possible definition of
marriage.
The Hawaii court's argument that the definition of marriage has changed
relies on the rationale of Loving v. Virginia and its conclusion, adopted by
the Hawaii court that, "customs change with an evolving social order.''24°
The Hawaii court took the shift in racial categories as applied to marriage in
the Loving decision, and held that the evolving social order now demanded
strict scrutiny of any marriage restrictions involving race or gender.241 This
extension of Loving to couples of the same gender makes Baehr unique. The
court rejected the argument of the state which "proposes that 'the right of
persons of the same sex to marry one another does not exist because mar-
235. See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., A History of Same-Sex Marriage, 79 VA. L.
REV. 1419 (1993); William Hohengarten, Note, Same-Sex Marriage and the Right of Privacy, 103
YALE L.J. 1495 (1994).
236. See Peter G. Guthrie, Annotation, Marriage Between Persons of the Same Sex, 63
A.L.R.3d 1199, 1199 (1975) (summarizing state court decisions in New York, Minnesota, Wash-
ington, and Kentucky which held there is "no valid marital contract [between] persons of the
same sex").
237. See Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307 (D.C. 1995); Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d
1187 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974).
238. See, e.g., Baehr, 852 P.2d at 55; see also Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12, (1967) (find-
ing marriage is one of "[the] basic civil rights of man, fundamental to our very existence and
survival"); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (finding "marriage and procreation
are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race").
239. See Baehr, 852 P.2d at 56 (recognizing that "[i]mplicit in the Zablocki court's link be-
tween the right to marry, on the one hand, and the fundamental rights of procreation, childbirth,
abortion, and child rearing, on the other, is the assumption that the one is simply the logical
predicate of the others."). But cf. id. at 58-59. However, the Hawaii court lists the rights and
benefits arising out of marriage without reference to procreation and childbirth. See id. at 58 n.1.
240. See id. at 63.
241. See id. Opponents of the Hawaii decision argue that if single-gender marriage is al-
lowed, the changing social order, with neither rule nor travail, will eventually allow for polyg-
amy, incest and other social possibilities. See, e.g., Editorial, Who's Boss?, WALL ST. J., Dec. 20,
1996, at A16 (arguing that legislation from bench suggests new level of audacity).
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riage, by definition and usage, means a special relationship between a man
and a woman."' 242 The Hawaii court found this argument to be "circular and
unpersuasive. ' ' 243 That is, the Hawaii court stated that, since any argument
involving the possibility of single-gender marriage could be rejected because
of the definition of marriage, no argument could be made for single-gender
marriage. The Hawaii Supreme Court then demanded that the trial court
determine if there is a compelling state interest which would justify prevent-
ing single-gender marriage.244
Second, the Hawaii Supreme Court was very careful to formulate the
case in the context of gender, not sexual orientation. According to the court,
"'[h]omosexual' and 'same-sex' marriage are not synonymous .... Parties to
'a union between a man and a woman' may or may not be homosexuals.
Parties to a same-sex marriage could theoretically be either homosexuals or
heterosexuals. ' 245 The court opined: "it is irrelevant, for purposes of the
constitutional analysis germane to this case, whether homosexuality consti-
tutes an 'immutable trait' because it is immaterial whether the plaintiffs...
are homosexuals .... -246 The Court continued: "we disagree with Chief
Judge Bums' position that 'questions whether heterosexuality, homosexual-
ity, bisexuality, and asexuality are "biologically fated" are relevant questions
of fact.' "247
The media has made the Hawaii decision into one affecting gay mar-
riages and indeed, this was the posture of previous decisions. 248 Since Baehr,
both the state and the federal governments have passed legislation prohibit-
ing recognition of single-gender marriage, and there is little doubt the legisla-
tion was passed in part because of concern over homosexuals being able to
marry.24 9 Why is gender significant? Partly because by concentrating on
gender rather than sexual orientation, the Hawaii decision avoids two previ-
242. See Baehr, 852 P.2d at 61.
243. See id.
244. See id. at 68. The trial began in September 1996. See generally Matsuoka, And Now
the Trial, HONOLULU STAR BULL., May 14, 1996, at Al. It ended December 3, 1996. See gener-
ally, Susan Essoyan & Bettina Boxall, Hawaii Ruling Lifts Ban on Marriage of Same-Sex
Couples, L.A. TiMEs, Dec. 4, 1996, at Al; Carey Goldberg, Hawaii Judge Ends Gay-Marriage
Ban, N.Y. TiMEs, Dec. 4, 1996, at Al.
245. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 51 n.11. It was John C. Lewin, Director of the Department of
Health of the State of Hawaii, who, by virtue of his motion for judgment on the pleading, had
sought to place the question of homosexuality in issue. See id. at 51 n.12.
246. Id. at 54.
247. Id. at 53 n.14. The Hawaii Supreme Court dismissed the lower court's conclusions of
law involving the question of homosexuality and sexual orientation as well. See id. at 53-54.
248. See, e.g., Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307 (D.C. 1995). See generally Ho-
MER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES §2.8 (2d ed.
1988).
249. See Paul M. Barrett, I Do/No You Don't. How Hawaii Became Ground Zero in Battle
Over Gay Marriages, WALL ST. J., June 17, 1996, at 1. President Clinton signed the Defense of
Marriage Act in September 1996. See Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419
(1996) (codified as amended at 1 U.S.C. §7; 28 U.S.C. §1738(C) (West Supp. 1997)). See gener-
ally Reske, A Matter of Full Faith, A.B.A. J., July 1996, at 32. Reske lists ten states which have
passed specific legislation to prohibit recognition of single-gender marriage. See id. At the date
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ous United States Supreme Court decisions. The first one, in 1986, Bowers v.
Hardwick,250 asked "whether the Federal Constitution confers a fundamental
right upon homosexuals to engage in [consensual] sodomy and hence invali-
dates the laws of the many States that still make such conduct illegal and
have done so for a very long time."'251 The court answered "no" to the ques-
tion, but cases decided since 1986 by the court invited a host of other issues
surrounding equal protection analysis and homosexual conduct, privacy pro-
tection and even due process rights. 252 The Hawaii court skirts the labyrinth
of federal constitutional issues surrounding sexual orientation, by focusing
instead on "gender" and questions of privacy and equal protection under the
Hawaii state constitution.
The second Supreme Court decision the Hawaii court avoids is Romer v.
Evans.253 Here, the Supreme Court held that when "Colorado voters
adopted by statewide referendum 'Amendment 2' to the state constitution,
[thereby] precluding all legislative, executive, or judicial action at any level of
state or local government designed to protect the status of persons based on
their 'homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or rela-
tionships,"' such amendment violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
United States Constitution.254 Justice Kennedy held that "Amendment 2
classifies homosexuals not to further a proper legislative end but to make
them unequal to everyone else."' 255 This Colorado cannot do. "A State can-
not so deem a class of persons a stranger to its laws."'256 The Hawaii court,
of publication of this article, at least 25 states have passed legislation prohibiting single-gender
marriage and its recognition. See, e.g., GA. CODE. ANN. § 19-3-3.1 (1996):
(a) It is declared to be the public policy of this state to recognize the union of man and
woman. Marriages between persons of the same sex are prohibited in this state.
(b) No marriage between persons of the same sex shall be recognized as entitled to the
benefits of marriage. Any marriage entered into by persons of the same sex pursuant
to a marriage license issued by another state or foreign jurisdiction or otherwise shall
be void in this state. Any contractual rights granted by virtue of such license shall be
unenforceable in the courts of this state and the courts of this state shall have no juris-
diction whatsoever under any circumstances to grant a divorce or separate maintenance
with respect to such marriage or otherwise to consider or rule on any of the parties'
respective rights arising as a result of or in connection with such marriage.
Id.
250. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
251. Id. at 190.
252. See, e.g., Shahar v. Bowers, 70 F.3d 1218 (11th Cir. 1995), vacated, 78 F.3d 499 (11th
Cir. 1996), reh'g granted, 114 F.3d 1097 (11th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 693 (1998); High
Tech. Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1990); Ben-Shalom v.
Marsh, 881 F.2d 454 (7th Cir. 1989); Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068 (Fed. Cir. 1989);
Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
253. 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996).
254. Id. at 1621.
255. Id. at 1629.
256. Id. at 1629. The American Catholic bishops have voiced concern for homosexual per-
sons and decried any discrimination directed against them. In a 1990 publication, Human Sexu-
ality: A Catholic Perspective For Education And Lifelong Learning, the bishops wrote:
We call on all Christians and citizens of good will to confront their own fears about
homosexuality and to curb the humor and discrimination that offend homosexual per-
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by focusing on gender, rather than sexual orientation, avoids the strict inter-
pretation of Romer as forbidding a "bare ...desire to harm" homosexu-
als,257 and allows single-gender marriage to be isolated from the animus
surrounding Bowers.2 58
Finally, a third point about Baehr v. Lewin is that it rests squarely on
Loving v. Virginia. The 1967 Virginia decision invalidating state laws against
racial intermarriage is particularly important because it describes marriage as
"one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happi-
ness." 259 Because marriage was an essential right, the Court sought a com-
pelling purpose for the state statute, but finding none, it invalidated the law
as violative of equal protection and repudiation of official acceptance of the
obnoxious eugenic theory that intermarriage between blacks and whites pol-
lutes the Aryan gene pool and threatens "White Supremacy. ' '26°
Even though Loving was decided by the United States Supreme Court
and involved only the United States Constitution, the Hawaii court adopted
this interpretation for the Hawaii State Constitution.261 The Hawaii State
Supreme Court admitted that in attempting to define privacy within its own
constitution, the court was "'led back to' the landmark United States
sons. We understand that having a homosexual orientation brings with it enough anxi-
ety, pain, and issues related to self-acceptance without society adding additional
prejudicial treatment.
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(1990). The Vatican's Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, wrote in its 1988 Letter
to the World's Bishops on the Pastoral Care of Homosexual Persons, that:
It is deplorable that homosexual persons have been and are the object of violent malice
in speech or in action. Such treatment deserves condemnation from the Church's pas-
tors wherever it occurs. It reveals a kind of disregard for others which endangers the
fundamental principles of a healthy society. The intrinsic dignity of each person must
always be respected in word, in action and in law.
Letter to the World's Bishops on the Pastoral Care of Homosexual Persons 10 (1988). See gener-
ally United States Catholic Conference, AWAY OUR CHILDREN: A PASTORAL MESSAGE TO PAR-
ENTS OF HOMOSEXUAL CHILDREN (1997).
257. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1628.
258. But see Shahar v. Bowers, 70 F.3d 1218 (11th Cir. 1995), where, a year before Romer,
the Eleventh Circuit remanded to the district court for it to determine under a strict scrutiny
standard whether the intimate association between a woman and a second woman whom she
planned to marry in a Jewish religious ceremony was protected by the First Amendment.
259. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967). Other Supreme Court decisions apply a
heightened level of scrutiny to state legislation which burdens an individual's right to marry. See,
e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 382-83 (1978) (support obligation of parent); Memorial
Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 269 (1974) (right to travel); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394
U.S. 618, 642 (1969) (residency requirements for welfare recipients); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316
U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (right to procreate).
260. Loving, 388 U.S. at 11.
261. See Baehr, 852 P.2d at 50 (citing HAW. CONST. art. I, § 5, § 6 (1978)). Specifically, Art.
I, § 5: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor be
denied the equal protection of the laws, nor be denied the enjoyment of the person's civil rights
or be discriminated against in the exercise thereof because of race, religion, sex or ancestry."
And also Art.I, § 6: "The right of the people to privacy is recognized and shall not be infringed
without the showing of a compelling state interest."
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Supreme Court cases .... ,"262 And in doing so, the court admitted it would
need to find a "new fundamental right"263 if it were to find constitutional
protection for same-sex couples, and it would have to look, "not to 'personal
and private notions', but to the . . .'traditions and [collective] conscience of
our people' to determine whether a principle is so rooted [there] ... as to be
ranked . . . fundamental. ' 264 The court could not find that applicants for
single-gender marriage have a fundamental right arising out of privacy or
otherwise. 265 It is interesting for analysis that while Loving firmly rested on
the fundamental marriage right of the two opposite gender persons, the Ha-
waii Supreme Court relied completely on Loving, yet concluded it finds no
fundamental right to marry for single-gender couples. Failing to find this fun-
damental right, but still relying on Loving, the Hawaii court utilized an equal
protection analysis and applied it to the issue of single-gender marriage to
arrive at its conclusion.
The Hawaii Supreme Court devoted a considerable portion of the deci-
sion to the facts in Loving. It described the slavery, the reliance by the trial
judge on what Divine Providence intended, and the decision by Chief Justice
Earl Warren to invalidate the state statute because it discriminates solely on
the basis of race, a denial of equal protection. The reliance upon Loving is
evident in the fact that even the dissent in Baehr was dismissed by the major-
ity as having been rejected previously in Loving.266 The Hawaii court goes
one step further. Failing to confine itself to the fact that Loving was a case
about racial discrimination, the Hawaii court focused instead on broader
equal protection of the laws. It stated, "as a rule our initial inquiry has been
whether the legislation in question should be subjected to 'strict scrutiny' or
to a 'rational basis' test."'267 Even though the court had not dealt with sex-
based classifications previously,268 it had held that "sex-based classifications
are subject, as a per se matter, to some form of 'heightened' scrutiny, be it
'strict' or 'intermediate,' rather than mere 'rational basis' analysis. '269 The
Hawaii Supreme Court thus opened the way to heightened scrutiny, although
it could not arrive at this level of review through denial of a fundamental
right.
The Hawaii Supreme Court required the highest level of scrutiny to sus-
tain the state statute-strict scrutiny-and this was the reason why the trial
court was directed to find a compelling state interest to justify it.270 That is,




266. See id. at 68.
267. Id. at 63.
268. See id. at 64. The court did note a preference for finding a compelling state interest as
a result of its holding in Holdman v. Olim, 581 P.2d 1164, 1167 (1978). See also Baehr, 852 P.2d
at 67.
269. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 65.
270. See id. at 65. In reaching this determination, the Hawaii court assumed the conclusion
of a case decided in the United States Supreme Court where a married woman and her husband
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because equal protection analysis under the Hawaii constitution afforded
"some form of 'heightened' scrutiny,"'271 plus the presence of the Equal
Rights Amendment in the Hawaii State Constitution, both allowed for sex to
be a suspect category for equal protection analysis.272 The result was that the
trial court was told to find a compelling state interest to justify the gender
distinction. The direction of the Hawaii Supreme Court was clear:
[W]e so hold, that [the statute] is presumed unconstitutional ...
unless Lewin, as an agent of the State of Hawaii, can show that (a)
the statute's sex-based classification is justified by compelling state
interests and (b) the statute is narrowly drawn to avoid unnecessary
abridgments of the applicant couples' constitutional rights. 273
The Hawaii Supreme Court's remand initiated a trial at the lowest level
of the state, Baehr v. Miike.274 Other events unfolded: within the three years
following the decision, the legislature adopted language for incorporation
into the state constitution which expressly banned single-gender marriage
and created a commission to study the controversial issue.275 In December
1995, the Commission on Sexual Orientation and the Law recommended 5-2
that single-gender marriage be permitted in the state.276 A proposal to allow
a state-wide referendum to vote on a state constitutional amendment ban-
ning single-gender marriages was declared invalid on March 24, 1997.277
Such a referendum, if it were to be included as part of the November 1997
elections, would have allowed the people of the state to vote for a constitu-
filed suit against the Secretary of Defense seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against en-
forcement of federal statutes governing quarters allowances and medical benefits for members
of the uniformed services. The statute provided that spouses of male members were treated
differently from spouses of female members, thus precipitating the issue of gender discrimina-
tion. The court found that there was gender discrimination, and some of the justices thought
that strict scrutiny should be applied. See Baehr, 852 P.2d at 66-67 (quoting Frontiero v. Rich-
ardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973)).
271. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 64.
272. See id.
273. Id. at 67.
274. CIV. No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996). On December 3, 1996,
Hawaii Circuit Court Judge Kevin S.C. Chang found that the state had failed to provide a com-
pelling state interest to deny single-gender couples a license to marry. Specifically, the court
rejected the state's argument that allowing same-sex marriages would have a negative impact on
development of children because it is in the child's best interest to be brought up by a mother
and a father. The court stayed it ruling pending the state's appeal to the Hawaii Supreme Court.
275. See 1994 Haw. Sess. Laws 217 §3 (codified as amended HAw. REV. STAT. §572-1),
which reads, "Requisites of valid marriage contract. In order to make valid the marriage con-
tract, which shall be only between a man and a woman, it shall be necessary ...." (emphasis
supplied).
276. See generally David W. Dunlap, Panel in Hawaii Recommends Legalizing Same-Sex
Marriage, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 11, 1995, at A18.
277. See Hawaii State AFL-CIO v. Yoshina, 935 P.2d 89 (1997) (holding that November 5,
1996 general election ballot on whether or not to convene constitutional convention did not
receive a favorable majority of the total ballots cast. Thus, because there were blank ballots and
over votes, the 163,869 persons who voted for the constitutional convention were less than half
of the 369,357 total ballots cast); see also Hawaii Probes Results of Constitutional Convention
Question, CAP. Max-rs. Rr-rs., Nov. 7, 1996, at 3.
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tional amendment which could affect single-gender marriage in the state. A
state constitutional ban on same-sex unions would make null and void any
judicial opinion. The invalidity of the November 1996 referendum petition
was particularly troublesome to those seeking to end the litigation and re-
store opposite gender marriage as the sole definition of marriage.
The failure of the state effort to place the referendum on the ballot was
precipitous for another reason: it occurred three months after the lower
court in Hawaii ruled that it could find no compelling interest of the State of
Hawaii to justify refusal of its officers to grant marriage licenses to same-sex
couples. 278 At trial, the State offered the following interests to justify its
refusal to issue a marriage license to same-sex couples:
(1) That the State has a compelling interest in protecting the health
and welfare of children and other persons. Specifically, the State
has a compelling interest to promote the optimal development of
children as, all things being equal, it is best for a child that it be
raised in a single home by its parents, or at least by a married male
and female;
(2) That the State has a compelling interest in fostering procreation
within a marital setting;
(3) That the State has a compelling interest in securing or assuring
recognition of Hawaii marriages in other jurisdictions;
(4) That the State has a compelling interest in protecting the State's
public fisc from the reasonably foreseeable effects of State approval
of same-sex marriage in the laws of Hawaii;
(5) That the State has a compelling state interest in protecting civil
liberties, including the reasonably foreseeable effects of State ap-
proval of same-sex marriages, on its citizens. 279
On December 3, 1996, Circuit Court Judge Kevin S.C. Chang rejected the
arguments of the State and ruled that the State of Hawaii had thus failed to
demonstrate any compelling reasons to prohibit same-sex persons from being
married.280 Relying in significant part upon the concurring opinion of Judge
Ferren's opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part in Dean v. District
of Columbia,281 Judge Chang concluded:
[The State] has failed to present sufficient credible evidence which
demonstrates that the public interest in the well-being of children
and families, or the optimal development of children would be ad-
versely affected by same-sex marriage. Nor has [the state] demon-
strated how same-sex marriage would adversely affect the public
fisc, the state interest in assuring recognition of Hawaii marriages in
other states, the institution of traditional marriage, or any other im-
portant public or government interest.282
278. See Baehr, CIV. No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235.
279. Id. at *3.
280. See id. at *46-47.
281. 653 A.2d 307, 355-56 (D.C. App. 1995) (Ferren, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
282. Baehr, CIV. No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235, at *21.
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The failed argument of the State of Hawaii seeking to arrive at a com-
pelling state interest in the context of equal protection analysis, should have
introduced into consideration the following issues: (1) the limits of equal
protection in the discovery of new constitutional rights; (2) the level of judi-
cial inquiry as exceeding this type of equal protection analysis; (3) reliance
upon Loving was more a product of wishful thinking than judicial prece-
dent-Loving, a case of racial discrimination with a distinctive social, legal
and historical basis (an American civil war was fought in large part concern-
ing this issue) is not the case of single-gender marriage, a notion that has not
reached the stage of even domestic partnership in most American jurisdic-
tions; (4) Loving involved a distinct fundamental right to marry which Baehr
expressly admits cannot be found within the context of same-sex marriage;
and (5) there is a vibrant social fabric, reliant in large part on the religious
underpinnings of generations which has been deprived of a voice in such a
radical transformation of societal precedent by a minority of jurists as to
"legislating from the bench. '283
The legislature, the people, the jurists and the plaintiffs themselves await
a decision of the Supreme Court of Hawaii. If that court upholds the finding
by Judge Chang that the state has failed to meet its burden to produce com-
pelling state interests, then single-gender marriage will become a reality in
Hawaii. This creates an interesting situation. That is, for at least a time, it
will be possible for single-gender persons to enter into marriage in Hawaii.
Although the marriages will be valid there, it remains to be seen whether
they will be valid in other states. The Federal Defense of Marriage Act284 is
one effort to prevent recognition. But legal commentators are marshalling
arguments in favor of state recognition of these single-gender marriages.
Larry Kramer, a Professor of Law at New York University Law School,
offers one argument. 285 He writes that states, when asked to recognize mar-
riages celebrated in other states, rely upon the traditional public policy ap-
proach: valid where celebrated, valid everywhere unless contrary to strong
state public policy. Such an approach was acceptable when recognizing an
act which had no judicial approbation, unlike a divorce which requires judi-
cial action. Professor Kramer rejects this public policy exception as unconsti-
tutional: "The Full Faith and Credit Clause prohibits states from selectively
discriminating in choice of law based on judgments about the desirability or
283. Editorial, Who's Boss?, supra note 241.
284. Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (codified as amended at 1 U.S.C.A. §7; 28 U.S.C.A.
§ 1378(C) (West Supp. 1997)).
285. See Larry Kramer, Same-Sex Marriage, Conflict of Laws, and the Unconstitutional Pub-
lic Policy Exception, 106 YALE L.J. 1965 (1997); see also Barbara J. Cox, Same-Sex Marriage and
Choice of Law: If We Marry in Hawaii Are We Still Married When We Return Home?, 1994 Wis.
L. REV. 1033; Deborah M. Henson, Will Same-Sex Marriages be Recognized in Sister States?:
Full Faith and Credit and Due Process Limitations on States' Choice of Law Regarding Status and
Incidents of Homosexual Marriages Following Hawaii's Baehr v. Lewin, 32 U. LOUISVILLE J.
FAM. L. 551 (1993-1994); Monrad G. Paulsen & Michael I. Sovern, "Public Policy" in the Con-
flict of Laws, 56 COLUM. L. REV. 969 (1956).
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obnoxiousness of other state's policies. ' 286 Thus, a sister state may not deny
recognition of a marriage celebrated in another state on public policy
grounds. Furthermore, Congress may not authorize them to do so through
the Defense of Marriage Act.2 8 7
Mark Strasser, agrees with Professor Kramer in principle, but adds a
distinction. 28 8 He writes:
The Full Faith and Credit Clause is intended to promote a variety of
purposes which include unifying the nation, reducing wasteful litiga-
tion, and increasing the predictability and certainty of judgements.
While the choice of law rules generally give much discretion to
courts, they give much less discretion in the context of the recogni-
tion of marriages than in other contexts, because of the importance
of the right at issue and the importance of respecting settled expec-
tations. Choice of law in the context of recognizing marriages cele-
brated in another state seems best understood as incorporating both
full faith and credit and choice of law jurisprudence. 289
The distinction and the conclusion implies that "if the state does not have an
evasion statute and has not declared the marriage void, courts cannot in good
faith hold that the state will not recognize the union. '2 90
The debate over recognition will mount and there will certainly be suffi-
cient cases to test the constitutional waters should there be a period in Ha-
waii when single-gender marriage is available and valid. To prevent this
possibility, the Hawaii legislature has passed a resolution calling for a consti-
tutional convention to be held in early 1998. While this is not certain, polls in
Hawaii suggest that when the people in Hawaii are asked to ratify a constitu-
tional amendment banning single-gender marriage, they will do so. Nonethe-
less, in the meantime, as a means to provide benefits to homosexual couples
who do not wish to enter into marriage with a person of the opposite sex, the
Hawaii legislature offered a unique benefit package. The package, similar to
a domestic partnership program but far more extensive, offers to couples
composed of two individuals who are legally prohibited from marrying under
state law many of the benefits of married couples. The legislation became
effective July 1, 1997. It establishes "Reciprocal Beneficiaries. '29 1 The pur-
pose of the legislation is explanatory:
Section 2. Findings. The legislature finds that the people of Hawaii
choose to preserve the tradition of marriage as a unique social insti-
tution based upon the committed union of one man and one
286. Kramer, supra note 285, at 1967.
287. See id. at 2008.
288. See generally MARK STRASSER, LEGALLY WED: SAME-SEx MARRIAGE AND THE CON-
STITUTION 1 (1997).
289. Mark Strasser, Judicial Good Faith and the Baehr Essentials: Giving Credit Where It's
Due, 28 RUTGERS L.J. 313, 365 (1997).
290. Id. at 365-66.
291. See HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 572C-1 (Michie 1997). Response to the new benefits has
not been enthusiastic. Even though 5,000 people obtained applications, only 296 couples actu-
ally signed up. See Hawaii's Domestic Partnership Law A Bust, WASH. POST, Dec. 25, 1997, at
A14.
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woman. The legislature further finds that because of its unique sta-
tus, marriage provides access to a multiplicity of rights and benefits
throughout our laws that are contingent upon that status. As such,
marriage should be subject to restrictions such as prohibiting re-
spective parties to a valid marriage contract from standing in rela-
tion to each other, i.e. brother and sisters of the half as well as to the
whole blood, uncle and niece, aunt and nephew. However, the leg-
islature concurrently acknowledges that there are many individuals
who have significant personal, emotional, and economic relation-
ships with another individual yet are prohibited by such restrictions
from marrying. For example, two individuals who are related to one
another, such as a widowed mother and her unmarried son, or two
individuals who are of the same gender. Therefore, the legislature
believes that certain rights and benefits presently available only to
married couples would be made available to couples comprised of
two individuals who are legally prohibited from marrying one
another.292
After defining what is required to enter into the described "committed
relationship," the statute then seeks to include benefits similar to those en-
joyed by married couples, including among others: hospital visitation, inclu-
sion within medical insurance coverage, election against a valid last will and
testament, availability of tenancy by the entirety, survivorship under intestate
succession and the benefit of augmented estate practices.293 The intent is to
provide benefits to persons unable to marry, but still retain the unique status
of marriage as that between a man and a woman.
Even though the reciprocal beneficiaries statute is currently in effect in
Hawaii, there still is no constitutional amendment banning single-gender un-
ions. Thus there is the conflict between the judicially created right to marry
of Baehr v. Miike and the legislative enactment of reciprocal beneficiaries.
Single-gender marriage may still occur. Whether there is subsequent recog-
nition of these marriages in other states is problematic because of the appar-
ent and traditional inapplicability of the Full Faith and Credit Clause to
marriage. 294 But, as has been discussed earlier, this is now the subject of
debate. There is also the reality of the fervor on both sides of the issue to
continue litigation no matter what the outcome,295 and the pressing desire on
the part of everyone in Hawaii to resolve the matter as quickly as possible.
292. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 572C-2 (Michie 1997).
293. See id.
294. See, e.g., Robert L. Cordell II, Same-Sex Marriage: The Fundamental Right of Marriage
and an Examination of Conflict of Laws and the Full Faith and Credit Clause, 26 COLUM. HUM.
RTs. L. REV. 247 (1994); Lisa M. Farabee, Marriage, Equal Protection, and New Judicial Federal-
ism: A View From the States, 14 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 237, 237-38 (1996) (arguing state courts
should recognize same sex marriage in an age of "judicial federalism"); Note, In Sickness and In
Health, In Hawaii and Where Else?: Conflict of Laws and Recognition of Same-Sex Marriages,
109 HARV. L. REV. 2038, 2038 and n.4 (1996) (arguing valid same-sex marriages should be recog-
nized as valid in all states as part of common law).
295. See, e.g., Cox, supra note 285; Mark Strasser, Domestic Relations Jurisprudence and the
Great, Slumbering Baehr: On Definitional Preclusion, Equal Protection, and Fundamental Inter-
ests, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 921 (1995); Evan Wolfson, Crossing the Threshold: Equal Rights for
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All parties involved-and America itself-must be asking how marriage
could be the subject of such a debate. Such a legal predicament gives new
meaning to all the perniciousness of "shotgun."
CONCLUSION
The 1993 decision of Baehr v. Lewin is significant in part because it is a
continuation of changes within the religiously organized and inspired under-
pinnings of American family law. These changes have been decades in the
making. Nonetheless, unlike changes in state statutes, for instance, regarding
the nature of marriage between persons of opposite gender, the facilitation of
divorce, and the permissive ability of unmarried cohabitants to maintain legal
and social objectivity, the issue of single-gender marriage has captured the
imagination and both the praise and anger of many Americans. The anger
comes because-again as a product of lengthy changes-religious perspective
has been shunted aside when religion seeks to provide a sense of history, a
sense of natural law, and a sense of critique of American society. The irrele-
vancy of religion has become a hallmark of portions of American society.
The comments and underlying assumptions of the justices in Hawaii,296 the
mayors of San Francisco and Boston, 297 and the observations of Professor
Carter provide examples. 298 Judicial activism facilitates rejection of religion
by depriving religion of a voice in any political process rejecting or sustaining
something so fundamental as the definition of marriage. Religious people
are angry because their voices are deemed irrelevant.
It is not that any particular religion seeks to force a totalitarian view
upon the rest of American society. It is that religion: (1) has a world view
forged by society, tradition, and in some cases a magisterium; (2) has a right
to present this world view consistent with the free exercise provisions of the
Constitution; (3) is willing to allow that world view to be examined objec-
tively and critically; (4) that world view has, does, and will continue to serve
the social programs which religion thinks are necessitated by the rejection of
this world view; and (5) that the service to these social programs is marked by
extreme generosity. Whenever America seeks to quash religious critique as
the means by which to preserve separation of church and state, America ab-
rogates both the mission and the protection of religion embodied in the First
Amendment.
Judicial activism, especially that demonstrated in Baehr v. Lewin, de-
prives religion of a voice, a critique, an interaction with the legislative pro-
cess. When the court, any court, announces a change in deeply held customs,
it acts as a super-legislature, providing oligarchy in lieu of democracy. The
sudden rush to pass legislation prohibiting any consequences from the Ha-
Lesbians and Gay Men and the Intra-Community Critique, 21 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE
567 (1994).
296. See discussion supra Part III.
297. See supra text accompanying notes 138-153.
298. See supra text accompanying notes 51-54, 63-66, and 75-77.
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waii decision demonstrates the insular opinion in Hawaii, 299 the nature of
what is fundamental, and a sure contrast between judicial activism and legis-
lative enactment. The racial climate of Loving v. Virginia was different. The
time was the mid-sixties, civil rights and change had come to America, there
was a democratic and a social climate, and certainly a judicial climate, which
represented equal protection and an attempt to eradicate discrimination. It
can certainly be factually demonstrated that religion was there at the front
throughout the era of civil rights change; indeed, religious hymns formed the
battle cry.3° ° This is not the case with single-gender marriage and thus, abso-
lutely, the courts have no basis whatsoever to justify recognition of single-
gender marriage.
The Roman Catholic Church, especially in the documents of the Second
Vatican Council, the writings of Pope John Paul II and the statements of the
American bishops,30 1 present a religious perspective which defines marriage
within the context of biblical texts dated thousands of years. These texts de-
fine marriage as a union between a man and a woman and, whether able to
have children or not, their union is normative for the marital state, one which
cannot accommodate the shift to secular notions of gender. For this reason, a
reason based upon religious perspective, neither state legislatures nor state
courts should allow for single-gender marriage. Additionally, neither legisla-
tures nor state courts should expand the definition of marriage to accommo-
date single gender. This is so, in part, because of the compelling interest
demonstrated in the society of Hawaii. At this point in the public debate, it is
evident that the people of Hawaii do not regard single-gender marriage as a
part of their collective conscience. The compelling state interest is to pre-
serve a public policy originating in a pluralistic society, but adamant in main-
taining a definition of marriage as a union between a man and a woman. The
fact that this represents the icon of a Judeo-Christian heritage is both reli-
gious and secular. But of paramount importance, it is a compelling public
policy in Hawaii. This is reflected in the dramatic and vociferous opposition
mounted to retain the traditional definition of marriage and to suppress the
judicial activism of a few who have decide that "times have changed. '30 2
The religious perspective offered in opposition to single-gender marriage
is not based in bigotry; indeed, if one takes the Hawaii decision at face value,
this is not an issue involving sexual orientation, particularly gay and lesbian
persons. Instead, the religious perspective offered is one of definition, not a
definition formed in secret or without social practice for generations, nor
without a rational basis for society as a whole. Indeed, the religious perspec-
tive offers a definition of marriage-and marriage alone-as one formed
from the practice of men and women from Adam and Eve through every
other cultural recounting of creation, and practiced today at every moment of
every day. Religion's definition of marriage is both compelling and manifest
299. See supra text accompanying notes 57-61.
300. See supra discussion pp. 441-44.
301. See supra Part II.B-D.
302. See supra text accompanying notes 236-39.
Spring 19981
484 TEMPLE POLITICAL & CIVIL RIGHTS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7:429
and prohibitive of single-gender solemnization. Neither the court nor the
legislatures should do otherwise.
